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This dissertation presents a critical analysis of section 6(4) of the Employment Equity 
Act 55 of 1998 (“EEA”) and seeks to address the question of whether it is likely to 
achieve its stated objective of giving effect to the constitutional right to equality.  In 
conducting my analysis, I consider the concept of managerial prerogative and discuss 
what underlies the drive for substantive equality in order to determine why the issue 
of protection from discriminatory income disparities has been removed from the realm 
of an employer’s traditional prerogative.  Next, I highlight the requirements for 
establishing a claim of discrimination in terms section 6(4) and the remedies available 
to a successful complainant.  I then turn to highlight the limitations introduced by the 
statutorily prescribed comparator in section 6(4) before demonstrating that the 
regulated methodology for assessing the value of work and the factors for justifying a 
differentiation in terms and conditions of employment give significant deference to 
employer prerogative.  My analysis proceeds to consider whether, following the 
introduction of section 6(4), an administrative body whose primary function is the 
conduct of formal investigation into discriminatory pay practices and the resolution 
of equal pay disputes ought to have been created.  I ultimately conclude that section 
6(4) of the EEA provides only a partial solution to the issue of discriminatory pay 
disparities in South Africa and is likely to have a limited effect in contributing to the 
achievement of the State’s objective of achieving substantive equality.  In analysing 
section 6(4), I draw on the experience of the United Kingdom, the United States of 
America and Canada.  While the socio-economic and political landscapes of these 
jurisdictions may not be apposite to the South African experience, these jurisdictions 
have a long legislative history in pay equality issues which assist in establishing a 
benchmark for South Africa.    
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1. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
1.1. Introduction 
Unequal pay is said to be a ‘stubborn and universal problem’.1    
In the international law context, the right to equal remuneration has been 
acknowledged by the International Labour Organisation (“ILO”) since as early as 
1919.2  The introductory provisions of the ILO Constitution expressly recognise 
equal pay for equal work as a ‘key element of social justice’.3  This recognition 
precipitated the creation of the Equal Remuneration Convention (“Convention”),4 
which largely centers on requiring equal pay for women and men performing work 
of equal value.  Notably, the provisions of the Convention focused on the 
achievement of pay equity between men and women given that, at the time of its 
inception at the end of World War II, ‘differences in pay [between men and women 
was] one of the most obvious and measurable forms of discrimination’.  
Notwithstanding the restrictive scope of this Convention, the Convention ‘was 
forward-looking at the time and is [considered] still particularly relevant’ given that 
it ‘allows for the means of application to evolve.5 
 
1 Martin Oelz, Shauna Olney, Manuela Tomei Equal pay: an introductory guide (2013) International 
Labour Organisation, available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/--
-publ/documents/publication/wcms_216695.pdf (accessed on 22 June 2015). 
2 Article 427 of the Treaty of Versailles: ILO, Geneva, Official Bulletin, Vol. 1, April 1919 to August 
1920. 
3 Oelz, Olney & Tomei op cit (n1) at 3. 
4 Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100). 
5 Oelz, Olney & Tomei op cit (n1) at 3. 
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The provisions of this Convention come into force for any ratifying member 
twelve months after the date upon which its ratification has been registered with the 
Director-General of the International Labour Office.6  Pursuant to Article 2 of the 
Convention, each member is required to ‘promote and, insofar as is consistent with 
such methods, ensure the application to all workers of the principle of equal 
remuneration for men and women workers for work of equal value’.  Member states 
are provided a sense of autonomy in determining the manner in which this principle 
may be applied and can elect between enacting national laws or regulations, 
establishing legal or recognised machinery for wage determination or a combination 
of these measures.7   
In the South African context, ‘as a result of apartheid and other 
discriminatory laws and practices, there are disparities in employment, occupation 
and income’.8  By way of example, black people,9 women and people with 
disabilities historically held a smaller range of job roles which has resulted in 
‘downward pressure on average wages in those occupations’ which is perpetuated by 
a ‘vicious cycle…justifying the continuation of lower pay’ for members of these 
groups.10    It is therefore unsurprising that since the advent of its constitutional 
democracy, South Africa ratified both the Convention11 as well as Convention 
concerning Discrimination in respect of Employment and Occupation No 111 of 
 
6 Article 6(3) of the Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No.100). 
7 Article 2 of Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No.100). 
8 Preamble to the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998.  Due cognisance of this context should be had 
when undertaking the comparative study proposed in chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
9 As the term is understood in the context of section 1 of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. 
10 Oelz, Olney & Tomei op cit (n1) at 3. 
11 Ratified in 2000. 
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195812 which prohibits distinctions, exclusions or preferences made on various 
grounds, including sex, that have the effect of impairing equality of opportunity or 
treatment in employment or occupation.13 
Although the Employment Equity Act14 (“EEA”) expressly acknowledges 
that the disparities referred to above must be addressed in order to inter alia 
‘promote the constitutional right of equality’,15 until the enactment of the recent 
amendments16 to the EEA, South Africa did not have specific legislation addressing 
pay discrimination, although remedies to address discrepancies in pay ‘have been in 
place from at least 1981 when the concept of “unfair labour practice” came into 
being’.17  The 1981 unfair labour practice jurisdiction fell away upon the 
promulgation of the Labour Relations Act (“LRA”).18  Until the enactment of the 
EEA, the concept of a residual unfair labour practice under the LRA enabled the 
Labour Court to adjudicate pay discrimination claims.19   
Thereafter, the promulgation of the EEA brought with it an express 
obligation on every employer to take steps to promote equal opportunity and 
eliminate unfair discrimination in any ‘employment policy or practice’, which is 
defined broadly to include ‘remuneration, employment benefits and terms and 
 
12 Ratified in 1997. 
13 Nomagugu Hlongwane ‘Commentary on South Africa’s position regarding equal pay for work of 
equal value’ (2001) Volume 11(1) Law, Democracy & Development Journal of the Faculty of Law, 
University of the Western Cape 69 at 71. 
14 Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. 
15 Preamble to the EEA.  See also section 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
16 Employment Equity Amendment Act 47 of 2013. 
17 Adolph A. Landman ‘The anatomy of disputes about equal pay for equal work’ (2002) 14 SA Merc 
LJ 341. 
18 Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
19 Landman op cit (n17) at 342.   
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conditions of employment’.20   While these provisions of the EEA made it possible 
for claimants to allege discrimination on the grounds of a disparity in pay for work 
of equal value, the premise that equal work should receive equal pay was ‘not 
enshrined as principles of law in the EEA’.21  
The lack of legislative provisions dealing expressly with pay discrimination 
was criticised by the ILO notwithstanding our Labour Courts ruling that pay 
discrimination is prohibited.22  Accordingly, section 6(4) of the EEA – which came 
into effect on 1 August 2014 – seeks to establish an explicit basis for equal pay 
claims and give effect to the constitutional protection of equality while achieving 
compliance with core international labour standards binding on South Africa.23  In 
addition, section 27 of the EEA requires every designated employer24 to take 
measures to progressively reduce income differentials or unfair discrimination by 
virtue of a difference in terms and conditions of employment as contemplated in 
section 6(4) if identified in any occupational level of its workforce. 
This dissertation will limit its analysis to whether section 6(4) of the EEA – 
which is applicable to every employer in South Africa – and the regulations issued 
pursuant to section 6(5) of the EEA achieve the aforesaid objectives.  Before doing 
so, however, it is apposite to examine the theories, processes and dynamics 
 
20 Section 5 of the EEA, as read with section 1. 
21 Landman op cit (n17) at 342. 
22 See Memorandum on objects of Employment Equity Amendment Bill, 2012 Government Gazette 
No. 35799 of 19 October 2012. 
23 Ibid. 
24 In the private sector, a “designated employer” is either (i) an employer who employs 50 or more 
employees; (ii) an employer who employs fewer that 50 employees, but has a total annual turnover that 
is equal to or above the applicable annual turnover of a small business in terms of Schedule 4 to the 
EEA; or (iii) an employer bound by a collective agreement in terms of section 23 or 31 of the LRA, 
which appoints it as a designated employer. 
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underpinning this legislative mechanism to regulate private employment 
relationships in an endeavour to reduce (and ultimately eradicate) discriminatory 
disparities in terms and conditions of employment. 
Accordingly, the primary enquiry this chapter seeks to resolve is why the 
legislature deemed it necessary to intervene in private employment relationships by 
way of provisions of the EEA commonly known as the “equal pay” or “pay 
discrimination” provisions and, in so doing, has effectively removed the task of 
addressing income disparities within the workplace from an employer’s 
prerogative.25  By considering the factors relied upon by employers to yield control 
over their workforce (which often fall short of a legal basis for the exercise of this 
authority) and the superior economic power wielded by employers to assert an 
entitlement to determine employees’ terms and conditions of employment, I will 
demonstrate that, if left to itself, there is unlikely to be an incentive for businesses to 
undermine their economic efficiency by acting fairly, altruistically or against the 
status quo. 
This chapter will first consider the concept of managerial prerogative before 
turning to discuss what underlies the drive for substantive equality.  Finally, this 
chapter will consider how and why the issue of protection from inter alia 
discriminatory income disparities has been removed from the realm of an employer’s 
traditional prerogative.   
 
25 The term “employer prerogative” and “managerial prerogative” are used interchangeably in this 
dissertation as they are both common parlance for the discretionary authority and control exercised by 
employers over their employees. 
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1.2. The meaning of and justification for managerial prerogative 
The term “prerogative” is commonly understood to relate to the ‘discretionary 
authority’26 held by a particular institution, group or persons and the concomitant 
rights and privileges flowing from this authority.27  In the context of labour relations, 
managerial or employer prerogative relates to an employer’s right to make ‘decisions 
in furtherance of operational objectives and to determine how these objectives will 
be executed’. 28 This right or privilege is closely related to an employer’s ‘ability to 
control the activities of employees in the workplace’.29 
Although South African labour courts acknowledge that some form of 
prerogative must be exercised within the workplace in order to ‘co-ordinate the 
skills, effort and activities’ of an organisation’s so-called “human capital” to achieve 
its inter alia commercial objectives,30 its departure point is often that there is a 
legitimate legal basis for the exercise of this right or privilege and its critique is 
limited to whether the exercise of this authority is proportional and rational to the 
objectives sought to be achieved.  But what are the legal bases or justifications for 
the exercise of this control? 
In his book Managerial Prerogative and the Question of Control,31 John 
Storey suggests that the justification for an employer’s ability to exercise a 
 
26 See Sachs v Donges, NO 1950 (2) SA 265 (A) at 275, albeit it in the context of discussing executive 
authority. 
27 EML Strydom ‘The origin, nature and ambit of employer prerogative (part 1)’ (1991) 11 SA Merc LJ 
40 at 41. 
28 CR Shooter ‘Managerial prerogative: a cosseted preserve of our labour system or a fool’s safe haven?’ 
(2010) SA Merc LJ 22 at 532. 
29 Strydom op cit (n27) at 42. 
30 Strydom op cit (n27) at 43.  SATAWU v Old Mutual Life Assurance Company South Africa Ltd and 
Another [2005] 4 BLLR 378 (LC) at para 85.  
31 John Storey Managerial prerogative and the question of control (2015) e-book version. 
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discretionary right or privilege to control and manage rests on four pillars, namely (i) 
the ownership of property; (ii) the statutory law of ownership responsibility; (iii) the 
argument for economic efficiency; and lastly (iv) the argument that decision-making 
should be left to those identifiable as ‘leaders’.  Each of these sources of the apparent 
right to manage and control will be discussed briefly below. 
The first of the underlying justifications for an employer’s right to control is 
linked to its right of ownership over its property.  Storey explains that this 
justification is derived from the premise that as owners of capital assets, employers 
should have control over such assets.  Given that, traditionally, employees own no 
part of these assets, ‘the way in which they are utilised is solely a matter for the 
owners and their representatives’.32 
1.2.1. Reliance on the right of ownership 
The reliance on common law rights of ownership to justify control over employees 
has been criticised on the basis that ‘property rights give the employer the right to 
make decisions regarding the economic or business component of the business [but] 
they do not per se afford the employer the right to manage its employees’.33  
Accordingly, where employers seek to legitimise their power of control with 
reference to their property rights of ownership, they are clearly exposing themselves 
to objections ranging from ‘how acquisition rights were secured’ to ‘denials that 
possession [of property] necessarily involves the granting of full ownership rights’.34   
Therefore, while a reliance on property rights may provide a possible justification for 
 
32 Storey op cit (n31) at 149. 
33 Strydom op cit (n27) at 48. 
34 Storey op cit (31) at 170. 
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an exercise of power, it does not provide a legal basis for the exercise of such power, 
thereby rendering this power susceptible to external interference.  
1.2.2. Statutory law of ownership responsibility 
The second pillar upon which an employer’s prerogative of control rests pertains to 
statutory law of ownership responsibility.35  By way of example, Storey refers to 
British company law which ‘puts responsibility firmly in the hands of shareholders’ 
and suggests that this is a reason why authority must be concentrated in the hands of 
“management”. 36    
In the South African context, a company’s business and affairs are required 
to be managed by or under the direction of its board of directors and not by its 
shareholders.37  However, while the board of directors has the authority to exercise 
all of the powers and perform any of the functions of the company, this authority is 
limited by statute and a company's Memorandum of Incorporation.38   Given that a 
profit company’s (other than a state-owned company) Memorandum of 
Incorporation must provide for the election by its shareholders of at least 50% of the 
directors, and 50% of any alternate directors,39 and shareholders are empowered to 
remove a director by ordinary resolution before the expiration of his or her period of 
office,40 directors (as the delegated “managers” of an enterprise) ‘will be constrained 
 
35 Storey op cit (n31) at 149. 
36 Ibid.  
37 Section 66 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
38 Ibid.  
39 Section 66(4)(b). 
40 This power is conferred on shareholders notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the 
Memorandum of Incorporation or rules of the company, or any agreement between the director and the 
company, see section 71(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
 9 
by their need for capital support from the owners (that is, the shareholders) which 
may be [withdrawn] if it appears that their objectives are different from those of the 
owners’.41  Therefore, a semblance of ownership responsibility and authority 
remains with the shareholders of a company.   
Further, Storey opines that in light of statutes (such as the Companies Act) 
dictating the composition of the board of directors, that is the “controlling mind” of 
an organisation, industrial democracy is only possible where there is a reform of 
these statutory provisions.42    
1.2.3. The economic efficiency argument 
The third pillar of justification for the exercise of employer prerogative is the 
“economic efficiency” argument.  This argument is based on the assumption that 
‘managers have the necessary skill and expertise to manage present-day 
undertakings’ and consequently, it is in the interests of consumers, shareholders, the 
nation and the workers that managers be left alone to manage as they see fit.43  
However, although this argument provides a reason why managers should in practice 
yield control over their workforce, it falls short of establishing a legal basis for the 
exercise of this authority.44  Despite this shortcoming in the argument, the ‘primacy 
of economic efficiency has nourished the doctrine of managerial prerogative [thus 
 
41 Strydom op cit (n27) at 48. 
42 Storey op cit (n31) at 150. 
43 Strydom op cit (n27) at 48. 
44 Ibid.  
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creating a spurious] duty to let management manage with the least possible 
constraints’.45 
1.2.4. Decision-making should be left to the ‘leaders’ 
Storey’s last pillar draws on an aspect of the social Darwinism theory and centres on 
the notion that there are persons naturally identifiable as leaders and those that 
perform best when led.46  This too falls short of providing a legitimate legal basis for 
the exercise of discretionary authority as it confers no legal duty on employees to 
obey such authority.47 
Essentially, it is submitted that the abovementioned set of justifications 
merely highlight the socio-economic considerations and realities that come to light 
when analysing the concept of managerial or employer prerogative, but they in fact 
fail to establish a legal basis for the exercise of this right or authority. 
1.2.5. The contractual relationship 
In his analysis of the origin, nature and ambit of employer prerogative, Strydom 
suggests that the legal foundation for the employer prerogative is ‘vested in the 
contractual relationship between an employer and employee’.48  Although there has 
been a degree of interference in the private employment relationships as set out in 
section 1.3 below, the basic common law premise that the employment relationship 
 
45 A Rycroft ‘Obstacles to employment equity: the role of judges and arbitrators in the interpretation 
and implementation of affirmative action policies' (1999) 20 ILJ 1411 at 1418. 
46 Storey op cit (n31) at 151. 
47 Strydom op cit (n27) at 49. 
48 Shooter op cit (n28) at 532. 
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is a contractual one has not been challenged by South African labour legislation.49  
Essentially, the element of subordination created by the contract of employment 
introduces the ‘lawful right to manage the employee, imposing upon the latter the 
concomitant duty to obey the employer’s instructions’.50   
While it is patently clear that the contract of employment may be a legitimate 
source for the authority asserted by employers, one cannot disregard the fact that this 
right or privilege is further bolstered by the employers’ superior economic power,51 
which power is essentially drawn from the set of justifications proposed by Storey.   
Thus, as submitted in further detail below, although legislative developments 
have attempted to steer society away from the common law conception of the 
employment relationship being one between a master and servant, the socio-
economic reality is that the employment relationship continues to be 
‘characteristically one between a “bearer of power”, on the one hand, and one with 
little or no bargaining power on the other’,52 thereby resulting in an ‘opportunity for 
the employer to extend its discretionary power within the workplace through the 
negotiation of a favourable contract’.53 
 
49 EML Strydom ‘The origin, nature and ambit of employer prerogative (part 2)’ (1999) 11 SA Merc LJ 
311 at 313. 
50 Shooter op cit (n28) at 532. 
51 Shooter op cit (n28) at 533. 
52 Strydom op cit (n27) at 49. 
53 Shooter op cit (n28) at 533. 
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1.3. “There is effectively no such thing as managerial prerogative”?54 
It is uncontroversial that the South African labour legislative framework has taken 
cognisance of the unequal bargaining power and consequent effect thereof on the 
nature of the rights and obligations vis-à-vis the employer and its employees.55 
Thus, although ‘South African labour legislation has not challenged the basic 
common law premis[e] that the employment relationship is a contractual one’,56 it 
has directly interfered in an employer’s prerogative regarding terms and conditions 
of employment.57  By way of example, the Basic Conditions of Employment Act58 
(“BCEA”) prescribes minimum terms and conditions of employment which apply to, 
subject to limited exceptions, all employees and employers;59 the LRA entrenches 
the right of every employee not to be subjected to unfair labour practices which 
includes inter alia unfair conduct by the employer relating to the provision of 
benefits;60 and the EEA obliges every employer to take steps to promote equal 
opportunity and eliminate unfair discrimination in any ‘employment policy or 
practice’.61   
The statutory interference referred to above is said to be an ‘inevitable 
consequence of industrialisation’ as ‘specific and binding legal regulations…limit 
 
54 Clive Thompson ‘Bargaining, business restructuring and the operational requirements dismissal’ 
(1999) 20 ILJ 755 at 758. 
55 Strydom op cit (n49) at 313.  
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997. 
59 Section 2, read with section 3 of the BCEA. 
60 Section 185 and 185(2)(a) of the LRA. 
61 Section 5 of the EEA, as read with section 1. 
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the freedom of the contracting parties and “steer” them into certain directions laid 
down …’ by the legislature in order to conform with the state’s broad political and 
social objectives.62  This process is broadly referred to as “juridification”, a term first 
defined by Otto Kircheimer in the 1920s as ‘a means of neutralising political 
conflicts with the help of formal legal regulation’.63  Essentially, “juridification” is a 
‘process (or processes) by which the state intervenes in areas of social life…in ways 
which limit the autonomy of individuals or groups to determine their own affairs’.64 
Juridification is said to be irrevocably tied to state intervention and an 
‘inescapable consequence of industrialisation in all democratic societies’65 with an 
‘irreversible trend’ being the ever-increasing extent of the legal regulation of 
industrial relations.  In his review of the juridification of industrial relations, 
Jon  Clark recognises that while the beginnings of juridification processes are similar 
in all countries, for example, limits on child labour and the introduction of health and 
safety laws, there may be a necessary divergence in the forms of juridification given 
the unique historical or socio-economic characteristics of individual societies.  
Despite processes of juridification unfolding in different ways and at different paces, 
the effect thereof is the same, namely, the ‘employer and employee are bound into 
conditions of action laid down in a statutory framework’.66 
The recognition of the fact that employers enjoy greater social and economic 
power than individual workers and the need to level the playing fields, so to say, to 
 
62 Jon Clark ‘The juridification of industrial relations: a review article’ (1985) 14 Indus L J 69 at 70. 
63 Clark op cit (n62) at 71. 
64 Clark op cit (n62) at 86. 
65 Clark op cit (n62) at 71. 
66 Ibid. 
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ensure that workers are able to act in concert to exert sufficient power to bargain 
effectively with employers appears to underpin the constitutional entrenchment of 
the right to strike and engage in collective bargaining.67  As a consequence of the 
juridification of labour relations in South Africa, Thompson proclaimed that ‘there is 
effectively no such thing as the managerial prerogative’.68  In substantiation of this 
view, Thompson argues that inter alia the South African collective bargaining 
landscape effectively erodes the concept of managerial prerogative in our labour 
law.69   
Notwithstanding the above, Thompson argues that the ‘absence of 
managerial prerogative does not mean that management cannot have its way’.70  
This contention draws on the socio-economic realities referred to above, that is, 
employers are able to wield a ‘range of weapons’ including dismissal and the 
implementation or discontinuation of benefit schemes71 given their great economic 
power thereby giving rise to bargaining power which can be used to give effect to an 
employer’s wishes.   
The power of the employer to negotiate favourable contractual terms with its 
employees remains strong, despite the legislative interventions referred to above.  
The sample surveyed in the Quarterly Labour Force Survey: Quarter 2, 2018 
revealed that, in the period April to June 2018, 54.62 per cent of employees had their 
 
67 Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly, ex parte: In re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of SA, 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) at para 66. 
68 Thompson op cit (n54) at 758. 
69 Thompson op cit (n54) at 759. 
70 Ibid.  
71 Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly, ex parte: In re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of SA supra (n67) para 66. 
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salary increments determined by their employers only, while 22.66 per cent of salary 
increments were negotiated through union led collective bargaining, collaborating 
the view that union power is not evidently resulting in excessive wage premise for its 
members.72  
The statistic that only 8.07 per cent of salary increments have been negotiated 
at the level of bargaining councils suggests that wage fixing remains largely 
organisation specific rather than collectivist in nature, with single employer 
bargaining preferred over multi-employer structures.73 
This decentralisation of wage bargaining appears to have reduced 
dependency on collective bargaining as a medium of change.74  In substantiation of 
this submission, in the period 2016/2017 only 17.6 per cent of the economically 
active South Africans chose to join trade unions.  This constitutes a decrease of 
37.1 per cent over the period 1995/1996 to 2017/2017.75  It is submitted that this is 
indicative of the increasingly marginal role of unions in workplace relations.76  
Through the development of performance-related pay practices, the scope of 
bargaining and the role of trade unions has been reduced.77  By way of example, 
 
72 Statistics South Africa Quarter labour force survey: quarter 2, 2018, page 70, available at 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02112ndQuarter2018.pdf (Accessed 12 December 
2018).  See also Haroon Bhorat, Karmen Naidoo & Derek Yu ‘Trade unions in an emerging economy, 
the case of South Africa’ DPRU Working Paper 201402 (July 2014) Development Policy and Research 
Unit at page 12. 
73 See the introductory comments on the move to firm-specific labour markets in John Purcell ‘The 
rediscovery of the management prerogative: the management of labour relations in the 1980s’ (Spring 
1991) 7(1) Oxford Review of Economic Policy 33 at 34. 
74 Purcell op cit (n73) at 37. 
75 Information on trade unions and membership, 1995/96 to 2016/17 received from analyst Gerbrandt 
van Heerden from the Centre of Risk Analysis on 9 January 2018 based on information sourced from 
the Department of Labour on 19 June 2017. 
76 Purcell op cit (n73) at 34. 
77 Purcell op cit (n73) at 40. 
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registered trade union membership has declined by approximately 26 per cent 
between 1994 and 2014 and the number of registered trade unions operating in South 
Africa has declined by approximately 14 per cent in the same period.78  The obvious 
impact of the decrease in reliance on collectivism is that there is a consequent 
decrease in the scope for employees to challenge the discretionary authority of 
employers in negotiating terms and conditions of employment.   
It is therefore submitted that the above explains why addressing issues of 
income disparities could not be left to the contracting parties to the employment 
relationship alone.  Before turning to discuss this submission and the legislature’s 
ancillary rationale for introducing the express prohibition against discriminatory pay 
practices in section 6(4) of the EEA, it is appropriate to consider the concept of 
equality. 
1.4. Equality, the Leviathan and the Tantalus79 
In her address at a conference in 2001,80 Beverley McLachlin PC characterised 
equality as the Leviathan of rights81 given that ‘[c]ourts and policy makers around 
the world have struggled with the meaning of equality and…its limits [which are] 
shaped by the political and social histories of the countries involved’.82   
 
78 Press release of the Institute for Race Relations “Trade unions lose control of the workshop floor” 
dated 9 February 2015.  Available at https://irr.org.za/media/media-releases/trade-unions-lose-control-
of-the-workshop-floor (Last accessed 8 January 2019). 
79 The Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, P.C, ‘Equality: the most difficult right’ (2001) 14 SCLR 
(2d) at 17. 
80 The ‘2000 Constitutional Cases: Fourth Annual Analysis of the Constitutional Decisions of the 
S.C.C’ on 6 April 2001. 
81 McLachin op cit (n79) at 19. 
82 Ibid. 
 17 
This is primarily because ‘the choice between different conceptions of equality is not 
one of logic but of values or policy’, that is,  
‘[e]quality could aim to achieve the redistributive goal of alleviating 
disadvantage, the liberal goal of treating all with equal concern and respect, the 
neo-liberal goal of market or contractual equality, and the political goal of 
access to decision-making processes’.83  
Hence, before turning to consider whether the provisions of section 6(4) of the EEA 
will prove effective in addressing discriminatory income disparities in the workplace 
and ultimately give effect to the constitutionally guaranteed right to equality, it is 
necessary to consider the different conceptions of equality. 
Invariably, an analysis of the concept of equality begins with a reference to 
the basic Aristotelian principle that likes should be treated alike.84  This formulation 
of equality prohibits direct discrimination or disparate impact.85  In considering what 
value the principle that likes should be treated alike might seek to achieve, 
Professor Sandra Fredman recognises the principle of consistency as being a central 
consideration.  In other words, where two individuals or situations are relevantly 
alike, they should be treated alike for consistency sake.86  Fredman identifies, 
however, the ‘consistency alone is a minimal value’ for a variety of reasons.87 
 
83 Sandra Fredman Discrimination law, 2nd edition (2001) at 1. 
84 Anne Smith ‘Equality constitutional adjudication in South Africa (Chapter 14 Vol 2) [2014] AHRLJ 
30. 
85 Sandra Fredman ‘Substantive equality revisited’ Paper No. 70/2014 University of Oxford Legal 
Research Paper Series, October 2014 at 6. 
86 Fredman op cit (n83) at 9. 
87 Fredman op cit (n83) at 7. 
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Firstly, not every distinction between similarly placed individuals or 
situations is discriminatory.88  Secondly, there is no ‘substantive underpinning’ for 
this principle of equality  in that the requirement of equal treatment does not allow 
for an acknowledgement of structural inequalities arising from South Africa’s socio-
political and economic past.  In this context, ‘insisting upon equal treatment in 
established inequality may well result in the entrenchment of that inequality’.89    
The third so-called drawback of equality in the form of consistency in 
treatment is the requirement that a complainant in a disparate treatment claim find a 
similarly situated comparator, that is, a similarly situated person who does not share 
the characteristic in question (for example, race or sex) has been treated more 
favourably in order to assert his or her right to consistent treatment.90  The 
underlying assumption is that once the personal characteristics of similarly situated 
individuals in an unequal treatment claim are disregarded, they can be treated the 
same on their merit, that is, there can be a “universal individual”.91  Fredman 
criticises the premise of the universal individual as being ‘deeply deceptive’ given 
that it ignores that there are other shifting levels and forms of social differentiation 
and systematic under-privilege which still persist.92  Accordingly, instead of creating 
a truly “universal individual”, there is ‘powerful conformist pressures’.93   
 
88 See the minority judgment of Ngcobo J in Minister of Finance & another v Van Heerden 2004 (6) 
SA 121 (CC) at para 118.  President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 (4) SALR 1 (CC) 41 
at para 41.  In the context of pay discrimination disputes, see Middleton & others v Industrial Chemical 
Carriers (Pty) Ltd (2001) 22 ILJ 472 (LC) at para 9.  
89 See the concurring judgment of O’Regan J in President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 
(4) SALR 1 (CC) at para 112.   
90 Fredman op cit (n83) at 10. 
91 Ibid.  
92 Minister of Finance & another v Van Heerden supra (n88) para 27.  See also National Coalition for 
Gay & Lesbian Equality & another v Minister of Justice & others 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at para 126. 
93 Minister of Finance & another v Van Heerden supra (n88) para 27. 
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The fourth problematic aspect of equality in the form of consistent treatment 
is that there is ‘no requirement that people be treated appropriately according to their 
difference’.94  To draw on Fredman’s example, while it may be appropriate for a 
woman to be paid less than a comparable man if she performs work of less value, 
equality as consistency does not require that she be paid proportionately to the 
difference in value of her work.95 
The final criticism of equality as consistency worthy of reference is that 
equality in this form is intensely individualist.96  By way of explanation, a major 
characteristic of equality rights has been the insistence that individuals be treated 
according to their own qualities and merits and not on the basis of the stereotypes 
attributed to their personal characteristics such as race or gender.97  As a result, the 
principle of equality as consistency has assumed that all aspects of group 
membership should be disregarded’.98  Fredman appropriately highlights that 
personal characteristics such as ethnicity, gender and cultural or religious affiliations 
are important aspects of an individual’s identity and diversity is often ‘enriching and 
desired’.99  Equality of consistency does not appear to acknowledge this and seeks 
the elimination of difference rather than the detriment attached to such difference.100  
In addition, this emphasis on individualism requires individual fault in order to 
 
94 Fredman op cit (n83) at 12. 
95 Ibid.  
96 Ibid. 
97 See Kriegler J’s critique in President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo supra (n89) para 80 and 
83. 
98 Ibid.  
99 Ibid.  
100 Ibid. 
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impose liability and does not take cognisance of the fact that prejudices are 
embedded in societal structures and cannot be clearly attributed to any one person.101 
Accordingly, although formal equality such as equality in the form of 
consistency may contribute towards eradicating personal prejudice, the deficiencies 
in this articulation of this right encourages a more substantive approach to equality 
that includes measures to redress existing inequality.102 
Substantive equality extends beyond the objective of equality of treatment 
and instead prescribes that there should be an equality of results.103  Substantive 
equality is said to recognise the ‘fallacy of formal equality’104 which seemingly 
reinforces inequality by not appreciating that identical treatment may reinforce 
inequality because of past or ongoing discrimination.105  To draw on Fredman’s 
example,  
‘if there has been race discrimination in the provision of education for black 
children, a requirement of literacy as a precondition for voting rights will, 
although applied equally to all, in effect exclude a significant portion of black 
people’.106   
Substantive equality introduces further difficulties in understanding the 
concept of equality in that its scope is unclear, thereby rendering McLachlin’s image 
of equality being the Leviathan of rights apposite.  Firstly, substantive equality may 
manifest itself in the form of promoting equality of results thereby addressing one of 
 
101 Fredman op cit (n83) at 14. 
102 Minister of Finance & another v Van Heerden supra (n88) para 31. 
103 Ibid.  
104 McLachlin op cit (n79) at 20. 
105 Fredman op cit (n83) at 14. 
106 Ibid.  
 21 
the shortcomings of formal equality, namely equal treatment may entrench 
antecedent inequalities.107  Understanding the objective of equality in the form of 
equality of results has not only been ‘seminal to the development of concepts of 
indirect discrimination’ but it has also made it possible for affirmative action 
measures to be seen as a tool to advance the quest for equality in our society.108 In 
terms of this approach, the objective is to achieve the fair distribution of benefits.109  
However, this notion of equality is said to be equivocal in that it can be used in three 
different ways.110   
The first manner of utilising a results or impact-based approach to equality is 
by focusing on whether the equal treatment has had an impact on the individual and 
providing a remedy, rather than equality of results, to the individual.111  The second 
manner in which equality of results may be used is to focus on the results of a group 
rather than an individual.  However, this approach does not concern itself with 
prescribing an outcome to achieve equality but rather emphasises the need to identify 
obstacles to entry.112  The third manner of achieving equality of results is by 
prescribing an equal outcome.  In this manifestation of the principle, there need not 
be a discriminatory factor requiring redress and a mere under-representation of a 
particular group would require action to achieve an equal outcome.  The primary 
shortcoming of this approach is that there is no examination of the structures that 
 
107 Fredman op cit (n85) at 12. 
108 Fredman op cit (85) at 1. 





perpetuate discrimination.  Accordingly, equality of results can be seen as providing, 
at best, ‘a partial framework for situating the right to equality’.113 
As such, equality of opportunity is said to be a ‘popular alternative to both 
equal treatment and equality of results’.114  This model aims to equalise the starting 
point rather than the result.  In practice however, equality of opportunity is ‘rarely 
used…when framing equality laws’.115  Instead, ‘legislatures, courts and theorists 
have searched for a more substantive notion of equality’, with the ‘foremost 
candidate [being] the notion of dignity’.116  The notion of dignity and the impairment 
thereof by differential treatment has been expressly recognised by the Constitutional 
Court in South Africa when developing our equality jurisprudence.117  
While the notion of dignity ‘creates a substantive underpinning to equality’, 
its use in the application of the right to equality is problematic to the extent that it is 
regarded as a separate inquiry in discrimination disputes, despite it being an abstract 
and subjective notion.118 
As evident from the above, there are various conceptions to the meaning of 
equality and the move from formal equality to substantive equality ‘recognises that 
 
113 Fredman op cit (n85) at 15. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Fredman op cit (n85) at 16. 
116 Fredman op cit (n85) at 17. 
117 See, for example, Prinsloo v Van der Linde 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC) quoted in Fredman op cit (n85) 
where Ackermann J stated that unfair discrimination ‘principally means treating persons differently in 
a way which impairs their fundamental dignity as human beings’. 
118 Fredman op cit (n85) at 19. 
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elaborating the right to equality requires a value laden choice as to its aims and 
purposes’.119  It is broadly recognised that  
‘in a country such as South Africa, persons belonging to certain categories have 
suffered considerable unfair discrimination in the past [and it] is insufficient 
[to] merely to ensure, through [a constitutional right to equality], that statutory 
provisions [or conduct] which have caused such unfair discrimination in the 
past are eliminated’.120   
Thus, section 9 of the Constitution contemplates both substantive and remedial 
equality in that it not only unequivocally asserts that equality includes ‘the full and 
equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms’ but it also obliges the State ‘to promote 
the achievement of such equality’ by ‘legislative and other measures designed to 
protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination’.121 
1.5. The interventionist State 
In pursuance of its constitutional mandate, the State has moved with alacrity from 
the so-called “reactive phase” of intervening in private employment relationships to 
address specific abuses arising in the employment context, to integrating regulations 
which serve to suffuse long-term state policy in private contractual relationships.  
This therefore marks a significant change in strategy from addressing specific abuses 
which cause social conflict to prevent such conflict.122 
 
119 Fredman op cit (n85) at 20. 
120 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others 1999 
(1) SA 6 at para 50. 
121 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others supra 
(n120) para 62. 
122 Clark op cit (n62) at 73. 
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An instance where this was patently clear was in former President Jacob 
Zuma’s inaugural State of the Nation address in June 2009 in which he highlighted 
the key provisions of government’s macroeconomic strategy and programme for 
action which has since become known as the New Growth Path (“NGP”).  Central to 
the NGP, we are told, is the recognition that ‘government has a critically important 
role to play in accelerating social and economic development including through 
effective regulation of markets’.123  It is therefore the stated ‘priority of government 
to deal with the inequalities left behind by the apartheid legacy [in order] to bring 
about socio-economic freedom’.124   
For the reasons set out in section 1.3, it is apparent that the achievement of 
equal pay in the workplace cannot be left to the parties to an employment 
relationship.  Given that ‘employer prerogative is at its strongest when the economy 
is at its weakest’,125 it has become necessary for the State to intervene through a 
policy of ‘calculated autonomy’, that is, where the ‘state affirms self-determination 
and self-regulation on the one hand, and on the other ties it into the system of rules 
governing the labour market which it (the state) has determined’.126 
The codification of the prohibition against discriminatory income disparities 
can thus be seen as an attempt by the State to reduce managerial prerogative in 
 
123 Economic Development Department “The New Growth Path: framework” (November 2011) 
available at http://www.economic.gov.za/communications/publications/new-growth-path-series 
(accessed 11 May 2015) at 12. 
124 Speech by the Minister of Labour, Honourable Mildred Oliphant, MP on the occasion of the 
Employment Equity and Transformation Indaba, Birchwood, Johannesburg on 18 April 2013.  
Available at http://www.labour.gov.za/DOL/media-desk/speeches/2013/speech-by-the-minister-of-
labour-hon-mildred-n-oliphant-mp-on-the-occasion-of-the-employment-equity-and-transformation-
indaba-birchwood-johannesburg (accessed on 19 May 2015). 
125 Strydom op cit (n27) at 52. 
126 Clark op cit (n62) at 74. 
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shaping relations at work and steer the employment relationship towards achieving 
broader socio-economic objects which conform to its own broad political and social 
objectives.127 
1.6. Structure of dissertation 
In my assessment of whether section 6(4) is likely to achieve its stated objective of 
‘[giving] effect to the constitutional protection of equality and [achieving] 
compliance with core international labour standards binding on South Africa’128, I 
first provide a brief overview of the history of enforcing claims for equal pay for 
equal work in South Africa before turning to consider the anatomy of section 6(4) of 
the EEA in chapter 2, the requirements for establishing a claim of discrimination in 
terms thereof and the remedies available to a successful complainant. 
In chapter 3, I introduce the comparative jurisdictions referenced in my 
analysis of section 6(4), namely the United Kingdom, the United States of America 
and Canada, setting out briefly an explanation of their equivalent “equal pay” or 
“pay discrimination” laws. 
In chapter 4, I seek to highlight the limitations introduced by the statutorily 
prescribed comparator in section 6(4), that is, an employee of the same employer 
performing the same, substantially the same or work of equal value.  In doing so, I 
argue that (i) the requirement to produce the correct comparator at the outset of 
litigation poses a significant burden on a complainant, particularly given the 
restrictions on obtaining sufficient data in support of a claim at the inception thereof; 
 
127 Clark op cit (n62) at 70. 
128 Paragraph 3.3.3 of the “Memorandum on objects of Employment Equity Amendment Bill, 2012” 
Government Gazette No. 35799 of 19 October 2012. 
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(ii) the limitation of the comparator to an individual within the same employer as the 
complainant leaves room for an unscrupulous employer to immunise itself from the 
operation of section 6(4) by transferring portions of its workforce to other entities; 
(iii) the need for a contemporaneous comparator has the potential to perpetuate 
disproportionate pay differentials along the lines of inter alia sex or race; and (iv) 
the requirement of identifying an actual comparator operates to effectively leave 
uniquely situated employees without redress. 
In chapter 5, I discuss the limitations of a regulated methodology for 
assessing the value of work and the apparent election of the legislature to limit the 
extent to which the State impinges on the prerogative of employers to demonstrate 
what factors are relevant to assessing the value of work by not requiring a more 
collective or consensus driven approach to job evaluation. 
In chapter 6, I demonstrate that the prescribed factors for justifying a 
differentiation in terms and conditions of employment give significant deference to 
employer prerogative and argue that there ought to have been a requirement, or at the 
very least, an encouragement for all employers (not just designated employers) to 
produce a plan for the reduction of differential payments. 
Chapter 7 of this paper considers whether, following the introduction of 
section 6(4) of the EEA, an administrative body whose primary function is the 
conduct of formal investigation into discriminatory pay practices and the resolution 
of equal pay disputes ought to have been created.  In this regard, this chapter 
considers the functions, scope and powers of the United States’ Equal Opportunity 
Commission, the United Kingdom’s Equality and Human Rights Commission and 
the Canadian Human Rights Commission.  It will conclude that in light of (i) the 
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already overburdened employment dispute resolution bodies in South Africa; and (ii) 
the unique and complex issues which may arise in pay discrimination claims, a 
specialised administrative body with the skills and expertise to inter alia carry out 
inquiries into the extent and causes of pay disparities in particular sectors or areas 
and to conduct investigations into employers alleged to have unlawfully 
discriminated against employees as contemplated in section 6(4) of the EEA ought to 
be have been established. 
Having considered the above, I ultimately conclude that section 6(4) of the 
EEA provides only a partial solution to the issue of discriminatory pay disparities in 
South Africa.  In this regard, it is likely to have a limited effect in contributing to the 
achievement of the State’s objective of achieving substantive equality given that (i) 
the complexity associated with the effectual articulation and prosecution of a claim 
under section 6(4) poses a significant challenge to redressing disadvantage;129 (ii) a 
complaints-based approach to addressing pay discrimination impedes the ability to 
effectively counter prejudice based on a protected characteristics and accommodate 
structural change and diversity; 130 and (iii) the structure of section 6(4) and its 
accompanying Employment Equity Regulations, 2014 are likely to be largely 
ineffectual in preventing employers from evading or changing their pay practices to 
suit their own economic or professional interests.131  It will therefore conclude that 
equality in the form of equal pay for equal work is likely to remain a Tantalus.  
 
129 Fredman op cit (n85) at 21 and 24. 
130 Ibid. See also Fredman op cit (n85) at 25. 
131 In this regard, reference will be made to the principles on which equity legislation ought to be 
structured proposed by Professor Bob Hepple QC in ‘Equality laws and economic efficiency’ (1997) 
18 ILJ 598 at 606. 
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2. ANATOMY OF SECTION 6(4) OF THE EEA  
2.1. Brief legislative history 
As set out in the preceding chapter, despite South Africa’s ratification of the 
Convention, until the assent of the Employment Equity Amendment Act 47 of 2013 
on 14 January 2014, no legislative provisions expressly addressing the issue of pay 
discrimination existed in our law.  Following the promulgation of this amendment 
Act, a new sub-section (4) was introduced to the prohibition against unfair 
discrimination in section 6 of the EEA ‘in order to deal explicitly with unfair 
discrimination by an employer in respect of terms and conditions of employment of 
employees doing the same or similar work or work of equal value’ where such 
differentiation is based on a proscribed ground set out in section 6(1) of the EEA.132  
Although this provision of the EEA has garnered significant attention following its 
promulgation, it does not represent a change in our law.   
Even prior to the introduction of the constitutional right to equality and the 
current section 6(4) of the EEA, an employer’s prerogative to determine the 
remuneration and benefits payable to employees was limited by the recognition that 
disparities in pay for similarly-situated employees, where the differences were based 
on reasons other than the employees’ skills and experience, may constitute an unfair 
labour practice in the form of discrimination.133  In this regard, the Labour Relations 
Act 28 of 1956 (“LRA 1956”) defined an unfair labour practice to include any act or 
omission which has or may have unfairly affected any employee or class of 
 
132 Memorandum on objects of Employment Equity Bill, 2012 at para 3.3.2 on 13. 
133 T Laubscher “Equal pay for work of equal value – a South African perspective” (2016) 37 ILJ 804.  
SA Chemical Workers Union & others v Sentrachem Ltd (1988) 9 ILJ 410 (IC) at 429E-F.   
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employees.  Claimants relied on this wide definition to argue that a failure to pay 
employees performing equal work in the absence of a good cause for the 
differentiation constitutes an unfair labour practice which was prohibited under the 
LRA 1956.134   
When the current LRA came into force on 11 November 1996, the definition 
of an unfair labour practice further facilitated the adjudication of claims for unequal 
pay for work of equal value as an unfair labour practice dispute given that the LRA 
initially broadened the definition of an unfair labour practice to include unfair 
discrimination.135  Therefore, although the premise of “equal work should receive 
equal pay” and “work of equal value should receive equal pay” were not enshrined 
as principles of law in the definition of an “unfair labour practice” in Item 2(1)(a) of 
Schedule 7 of the LRA, the Labour Court considered them to be ‘principles of 
justice, equity and logic which may be taken into account in considering whether an 
unfair labour practice has been committed…’.136 
Item 2(1)(a) of Schedule 7 of the LRA was subsequently repealed and 
replaced by section 6(1) of the EEA on 9 August 1999.  However, despite ratifying 
the Convention in 2000, the South African legislature did not incorporate a provision 
expressly prohibiting payment of unequal remuneration for work of equal value.  
Rather, this practice was only prohibited insofar as it amounted to direct or indirect 
unfair discrimination in terms of section 6(1) of the EEA in respect of employment 
policies or practices.   
 
134 National Union of Mineworkers v Henry Gould (Pty) Ltd & another (1988) 9 ILJ 1149 (IC) at 1158.   
135 Ntai & others v SA Breweries Ltd (2001) 22 ILJ 214 (LC) (“Ntai”).   
136 In Louw v Golden Arrow Bus Services (Pty) Ltd (2000) 21 ILJ 188 (LC) (“Louw”) at 196D-F. 
 30 
In order to establish a claim of pay discrimination prior to the enactment of 
section 6(4) of the EEA, an employee was firstly required to prove that he or she was 
a victim of discrimination.  Given that the ‘law anticipates that individuals and 
groups may be regulated differently without it being unfair’,137 the mere existence of 
disparate treatment between employees was considered insufficient to establish that 
a prohibited act of discrimination had taken place.  It therefore fell upon the claimant 
to demonstrate that the differentiation was either (i) indirectly discriminatory, that is, 
it impaired his or her fundamental dignity; or (ii) a differentiation based on a listed 
ground.138  Only once the above was established did the burden shift to the employer 
to demonstrate that there was a legitimate ground for the differentiation.139 
Despite our law recognising that unfair wage discrimination is prohibited, the 
memorandum to the Employment Equity Bill, 2012 explained that ‘the lack of a 
provision dealing expressly with wage discrimination on the basis of race and gender 
has been criticised by the International Labour Organisation’.  Therefore, the 
legislature envisaged that the new section 6(4) would not only provide an ‘explicit 
basis’ for equal pay claims but also ‘[give] effect to the constitutional protection of 
equality and [achieve] compliance with core international labour standards binding 
on South Africa.’ 
 
137 Middleton supra (n88) at 475.  In Mthembu v Claude Neon Lights (1992) 13 ILJ 422 (IC) at 423E-F 
the court held ‘[i]t would be in the interest of neither employers nor employees nor society in general 
to rule that an employer may not differentiate between employees on the basis of their productivity.’ 
138 Transport & General Workers Union & another v Bayete Security Holdings (1999) 20 ILJ 1117 
(LC) (“Bayete”) at para 4. 
139 Ibid. 
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2.2. Anatomy of section 6(4) of the EEA 
Turning to the anatomy of the new section 6(4) of the EEA, the section provides as 
follows: 
A difference in terms and conditions of employment between employees of the 
same employer performing the same or substantially the same work or work of 
equal value that is directly or indirectly based on any one or more grounds of 
unfair discrimination listed in subsection (1), is unfair discrimination. 
Evident from the formulation of section 6(4), the EEA does not create a 
positive right to equal pay for equal work.  Rather, there is only a limitation on the 
employer’s ability to differentiate between employees performing “equal work” 
insofar as such differential treatment amounts to unfair discrimination. 
2.2.1. The complainant 
The applicant in a discrimination claim based on section 6(4) is required to be an 
‘employee’ as defined in section 1 of the EEA.140 
2.2.2. A ‘difference’ in ‘terms and conditions of employment’ 
In order to bring a claim in terms of this sub-section, an applicant is required to 
demonstrate that there is a difference in treatment between the applicant and another 
employee of his or her employer due to a proscribed ground.  From the plain 
wording of the section, there is no threshold of materiality that must be reached by 
an applicant before the protections of this sub-section can be invoked.   
 
140 Section 9 of the EEA.  This includes an applicant for employment – Landman op cit (n17) and 
Lauscher op cit (n133) at 812 and her reference to Mias v Minister of Justice & others (2002) 23 ILJ 
884 (LAC) at para 28. 
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What would constitute a “term or condition of employment” to establish a 
claim under the section is not defined in the EEA or its accompanying regulations.  It 
is however clear that section 6(4) goes further than simply requiring equal pay or 
remuneration for the same work, substantially the same work or work of equal 
value.141  The general approach has been to interpret what constitutes a “term and 
condition of employment” narrowly as terms included in an individual contract of 
employment or collective agreements.  This may include, amongst other things, an 
employee’s salary, leave entitlement, working hours and access to training.  
Determining whether a particular aspect constitutes a term or condition of 
employment would therefore require an examination of the complainant’s contract of 
employment, any other document regulating the employment relationship such as a 
collective agreement, and any terms that may be implied from the parties’ conduct or 
from established custom in the workplace.142   
2.2.3. The comparator 
The requirement that an applicant in a discrimination claim under section 6(4) of the 
EEA present a comparator is statutorily defined.  In this regard, an applicant is 
required to demonstrate that the difference relates to another employee of the same 
employer, and that the other employee is in a situation analogous to him or her, that 
is, the other employee (or comparator) is performing the same work, substantially 
the same work or work of equal value.   
 
141 This does not appear to be acknowledged in the Code of Good Practice on Equal Pay/Remuneration 
for Work of Equal Value GN448 in GG 38837 of 1 June 2015 (“Code of Good Practice”) which appears 
to limit the scope of section 6(4) to requiring parity in pay/remuneration.  
142 Pikitup Johannesburg (SOC) Ltd v SA Municipal Workers Union & others (2014) 35 ILJ 188 (LC) 
at para 38 and 39. 
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On a plain reading of the sub-section, the applicant and the comparator must 
be employed by the same legal entity.  Therefore, employees in a multinational or 
group of companies would not be able to institute a claim in terms of this provision 
if his or her comparator is employed by a related entity, irrespective of whether these 
entities are controlled by the same shareholder or management structure.143 
Landman suggests that the “rules” about the permissible selection of a 
comparator include that the comparator must be a person doing the same or similar 
work or work of equal value at the same time as the applicant, that is, the comparator 
must be contemporaneous.144 
In respect of the query of when work is considered to be the same, 
substantially the same or of equal value, section 6(5) of the EEA confers the power 
to prescribe criteria and methodology for assessing work of equal value on the 
Minister of Labour.  Pursuant to this, the Minister published the Employment Equity 
Regulations, 2014145 which provides that work is considered the same for purposes 
of invoking section 6(4) where the work undertaken by the complainant and his or 
her comparator is identical or interchangeable.146  Work is considered substantially 
the same if the work undertaken by the complainant and his or her comparator are 
sufficiently similar that they can be reasonably considered to be performing the same 
job, even if the work is not identical or interchangeable.147   
 
143 In terms of section 2 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, a juristic person is ‘related’ to another juristic 
person if (i) either of them directly or indirectly controls the other, or the business of the other; (ii) 
either is a subsidiary of the other; or (iii) a person directly or indirectly controls each of them, or the 
business of each of them. 
144 Landman op cit (n17) at 346. 
145 Employment Equity Regulations, 2014 published in GN R595 in GG 37873 of 1 August 2014. 
146 Regulation 4(1) of the Employment Equity Regulations, 2014. 
147 Regulation 4(2) of the Employment Equity Regulations, 2014. 
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In broad terms, in considering whether work is of equal value, the 
Employment Equity Regulations, 2014 require the job of the complainant and the 
comparator to be objectively assessed taking into account, amongst other things, (i) 
the responsibility demanded of the work; (ii) the skills and qualifications (including 
prior learning and experience) required to perform the work;148 (iii) the physical, 
mental and emotional effort required to perform the work; and (iv) to the extent 
relevant, an assessment of the conditions under which the work is performed.  The 
work of the complainant and his or her comparator is of the same value where their 
respective operations are accorded the same value in accordance with regulations 5 
to 7.  Notably, neither the EEA nor the Employment Equity Regulations, 2014 oblige 
an employer to use a job evaluation system to determine whether work is of the same 
value. 
2.2.4. Stages of the dispute 
In essence, a claim under section 6(4) comprises of two stages.  First, for a 
complainant’s claim to qualify under the section, the complainant would need to 
establish that there is a difference in the terms and conditions of employment 
between him- or herself and the comparator despite the employees performing the 
same work, substantially the same work or work of equal value.  In respect of a 
claim premised on gender discrimination, the Code of Good Practice recognises that 
the ‘fact that there are no comparable male-dominated jobs to female-dominated jobs 
within the employer's organisation, does not necessarily imply that there is no 
discrimination on grounds of sex or gender (or other prescribed grounds)’.149  Thus, 
 
148 National Education, Health and Allied Workers’ Union obo Nquma v Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development [2017] 1 BALR 76 (CCMA) at para 27. 
149 Code of Good Practice, para 6.4.  While the existence of a hypothetical comparator in these instances 
may advance the legislative objective of section 6(4) of the EEA, it is arguable that the Code of Good 
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the Code of Good Practice permits a female employee to base a claim on the ground 
that they would have received higher rate of pay or remuneration if they were not 
female, that is, the employee may utilise a hypothetical comparator.150 
If a difference is established, the question then turns to whether the 
differentiation is prohibited for a reason set out in section 6(1) of the EEA, which 
includes an arbitrary ground.151  Consistent with the position adopted by the Labour 
Courts in pay discrimination disputes under the LRA 1956 and the now repealed 
Item 2(1)(a) of Schedule 7 of the LRA, a mere a differentiation is insufficient to 
succeed in a claim under section 6(4) of the EEA.152   
The Employment Equity Regulations, 2014 provide that a disparity in 
treatment between the applicant and his or her comparator may be justified if it is (1) 
fair and rational; and (2) based on:  
(i) seniority or length of service;  
(ii) qualifications, ability, competence, or potential above the minimum 
acceptable levels required for the performance of a job; 
 
Practice is ultra vires its enabling legislation given that it departs from the factual circumstances which 
the legislature prescribed must exist before potential liability may arise under 6(4) of the EEA.  See 
Road Accident Fund v Makwetlane 2005 (4) SA 51 (SCA) at 63H. 
150 Code of Good Practice, para 6.5. 
151 Where a complainant premises a claim on an unlisted ground of discrimination, the ‘complainant 
must clearly identify the ground relied upon and illustrate that it shares the common trend of listed 
grounds, namely that 'it is based on attributes or characteristics which have the potential to impair the 
fundamental dignity of persons as human beings, or to affect them adversely in a comparable manner 
…’ National Union of Metalworkers of SA and Others v Gabriels (Pty) Ltd (2002) 23 ILJ 2088 (LC) 
at para 19.  See also Sethole and Others v Dr Kenneth Kaunda District Municipality 2018] 1 BLLR 
74 (LC) and Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd v Workers Against Regression & others (2016) 37 ILJ 2872 
(LC) at para 55.’  In Ndudula & others v Metrorail — Prasa (Western Cape) (2017) 38 ILJ 2565 (LC) 
at para 108 the court held that, where a complainant relies on an arbitrary ground, the complainant 
must define the ground and has the burden of proof. 
152 Louw supra n135 at 196E-F.  
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(iii) performance, quantity or quality of work, provided that employees are 
equally subject to the employer’s performance evaluation system and that 
this system is consistently applied; 
(iv) where an employee is demoted as a result of organisational restructuring 
or for any other legitimate reason without a reduction in pay and fixing 
the employee’s salary at the same level until the remuneration of 
employees in the same job category reached this level;153 
(v) where an individual is employed temporarily in a position for purposes of 
gaining experience or training and, as result, receives different 
remuneration or enjoys different terms and conditions of employment; 
(vi) the existence of a shortage of relevant skill, or the market value in a 
particular job classification; and/or 
(vii) any other fact that is not unfairly discriminatory in terms of section 6(1) 
of the EEA.154 
A differentiation is furthermore considered “fair and rational” where its 
application is not biased against an employee or group of employees based on race, 
 
153 This is known as ‘red-circling’ and, as pointed out by Laubscher op cit (n133) at 824, it is not an 
absolute defence.  See Victoria Hooten ‘This is a (Wo)Man’s world: reforming UK Equal Pay’ (2015) 
3 Legal Issues J 65 at 77: ‘If discrimination has previously been a reason behind the higher pay of 
males, then red-circling will not protect an employer from an equal pay claim, as per Snoxell and 
Davies v Vauxhall Motors Ltd’ [1977] IRLR 123 EAT.  
154 Regulation 7(1)(a) of the Employment Equity Regulations, 2014.  See National Education Health 
& Allied Workers Union on behalf of Totyi and Airports Company SA (Pty) Ltd (SOE) (2017) 38 ILJ 
2637 (CCMA). 
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gender, disability or any other ground listed in section 6(1) of the EEA and it is 
applied in a proportionate manner.155 
Where reliance is placed on a factor referred to in Regulation 7(a) as 
described above, an employer is required to establish that such factor caused the 
differential treatment.  Furthermore, Regulation 7(2)(a) requires that reliance on 
these factors should not operate to the detriment of an employee or group of 
employees on the basis of race, gender, disability or any other listed ground.  Thus, 
the factor would need to be consistently and proportionately applied to all 
employees. 
Regulation 7 of the Employment Equity Regulations, 2014 does not require 
an employer to demonstrate that the difference in the terms and conditions of 
employment between a complainant and the comparator must be proportionate to 
any difference it considers there to be in the value of their work. 
2.2.5. Remedies 
In circumstances where it is found that an applicant has been unfairly discriminated 
against as contemplated in section 6(4) of the EEA, the Labour Court is empowered 
to ‘make any appropriate order that is just and equitable in the circumstances’.156  
This includes ordering that the employer pay the applicant compensation and/or 
damages.157  Further, the employer may be ordered to take steps to prevent the same 
 
155 Regulation 7(2)(b) of the Employment Equity Regulations, 2014. 
156 Section 50(2) of the EEA. 
157 Section 50(2)(a) and (b) of the EEA. 
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158 Section 50(2)(c) of the EEA. 
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3. OVERVIEW OF COMPARATIVE JURISDICTIONS 
3.1. Introduction 
In my analysis of section 6(4) of the EEA, I draw on the experiences and “equal pay” 
dispute resolution models of the United Kingdom, United States of America and 
Canada to identify shortcomings in the South African model and the scope for 
improving the efficacy thereof.  In doing so, I do not suggest that “functional 
equivalence” is required between South Africa and any of the three countries I have 
selected given that, admittedly, these countries have different socio-economic and 
political landscapes with long legislative history in equality issues which may not be 
apposite in the South African context.159  However, they have been referenced 
because they provide insight into possible “best practice” as well as deficiencies in 
the formulation and adjudication of equal pay rights and claims enabling one to 
identify a benchmark for South Africa. 
3.2. United Kingdom 
Although the origins of Britain’s pay equality legislation can be traced backed to 
1888, there was no legislative intervention to codify this for at least 75 years160 given 
 
159 I am mindful that a functionalist approach to the methodology of a comparison of law focuses 
primarily on the identification of the social purpose of the law and, in doing so, suffers the deficiency 
of assuming that legal systems face similar problems and despite the implementation of differing 
measures and systems, a common solution can be achieved such that the ‘‘rules of the law’ [can] 
travel across jurisdictions…unencumbered by historical, epistemological, or cultural baggage’ - Pierre 
Legrand ‘The impossibility of legal transplants’ (1997) 4 Maastricht J Eur & Comp L 111 at 114.  
See also O Kahn-Freund ‘On uses and misuses comparative law’ (1974) 37 Mod L Rev 1.  The 
Constitutional Court cautioned in Park-Ross v Director, Office of Serious Economic Offenses 1995 
(2) SALR 148 (CC) at 160 against legal transplantation because of the ‘different contexts within 
which other constitutions were drafted, the different social structures and milieu existing in those 
countries as compared to those in this country, and the different historical backgrounds against which 
the various constitutions came into being’. 
160 Ibid. 
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the preference of the British government to refrain from closely regulating industrial 
relations so that parties to an employment relationship regulate themselves through 
collective bargaining.161  
However, it later became apparent that voluntary collective bargaining alone 
would not achieve the objective of equal pay for equal work and, following the 
Labour Government’s ascent to power in 1964, there was a revision of the 
government’s abstentionist policy on the issue.  Pursuant to this, a Bill regulating 
equal pay for equal work was introduced and received Royal Assent in May 1970.  
In terms of this Bill, employers were given a period of five years to adjust their pay 
structures before the Equal Pay Act of 1970 (“EqPA”) came into effect on 
29 December 1975.  This five-year period is said to be a ‘remnant of the voluntarist 
approach to labour relations’ and a final attempt to afford employers an opportunity 
to correct their pay practices before state intervention to limit an employer’s 
prerogative.162  The EqPA did not establish a general right to equal pay for equal 
work or work of equal value.  Rather, it required equality in contractual terms and 
conditions of employment for men and women in same employment in two 
scenarios, namely (i) where they conduct “like” work; or (ii) where their work is 
rated as equivalent under a job evaluation study.  In respect of the latter, undertaking 
such a study was not obligatory.163 
 
161 Mildred Catherine Didio ‘Towards economic equality for women: Britain’s equal pay legislation as 
the model for lesson and reform’ (1989-1990) 5 Conn J Int’l L 353 at 363.  
162 Didio op cit (n161) at 364. 
163 Catherine Barnard ‘New developments in employment discrimination law: the UK report’ The UK 
Report Trinity College, Cambridge at page 32 available at 
https://www.jil.go.jp/english/events/documents/clls08_barnard.pdf (Last accessed 10 February 2019). 
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In addition to the EqPA, the United Kingdom acceded to Article 119 of the 
Treaty of Rome which obliged each member state to maintain the principle that men 
and women should receive equal pay for equal work.  Article 1 of Directive 
75/117/EEC (“Directive”) later clarified the ‘principle of equal pay’ to mean ‘for the 
same work, or for work to which equal value is attributed, the elimination of all 
discrimination…with regard to all aspect and conditions of remuneration’.164  
Further, the Directive provided that where a job classification system is used to 
determine the rate of pay, this system must be based on the same criteria for men and 
women. 
In 1981, infringement proceedings were instituted by the Commission of the 
European Communities against the United Kingdom in terms of which it alleged that 
the United Kingdom had incorrectly applied the provisions of Article 1 of the 
Directive given that, in effect, a woman cannot enforce a right to equal pay in terms 
of the EqPA in respect of work of equal value to her male counterpart unless a job 
evaluation study is applied by their employer, which study the employer is not bound 
to introduce.165  Ultimately, the Court of Justice found that the position adopted by 
the United Kingdom in the EqPA in respect of equal pay for work of equal value was 
‘not consonant with the general scheme and provisions of Directive 75/117’ given 
that the provisions of the EqPA did not provide a means whereby an employee who 
considers her post to be of equal value to another to pursue a claim for equal pay if 
 
164 Council of the European Union Directive 75/117/EEC. 
165 Judgment of the Court of 6 July 1982, Commission of the European Communities v United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, C-61/81, ECLI:EU:C:1982:258 (“Decision”) at 2604 
and 2605.  Available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:61981CJ0061&qid=1547090950262&from=EN (accessed 8 
January 2018). 
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her employer refuses to introduce a job classification system’166 nor did it ‘endow an 
authority with the requisite jurisdiction to decide whether work has the same value as 
other work, after obtaining such information as may be required’.167 
Following this finding, the Equal Pay (Amendment) Regulations 1983 was 
introduced to give effect to the EU law and a new residual basis for establishing an 
entitlement to equal pay, that is, where the work undertaken by a woman is ‘in terms 
of demands made on her (for instance under such headings as effort, skill and 
decision) of equal value to that of a man in the same employment’.168  In order to 
advance a claim of this nature, a complainant had to meet the requirements of 
establishing a prima facie case under the EqPA and demonstrate that her claim did 
not qualify as a claim for like work or work rated as equivalent.169 
Although the EpA ‘produced some modest and welcome improvements’, it is 
said to have been generally ‘ineffective and unworkable’.170  This has been attributed 
to the legislation being complex ‘beyond compare’.171  This much is evident from 
the fact that less than 1 percent of the equal pay claims in the employment tribunals 
in the year ending 31 March 2012 were successful at a hearing.172  The provisions of 
 
166 Decision, 2615 and 2616. 
167 Decision, 2617. 
168 B Hepple Equality the legal framework 2ed (2014) at 152. 
169 Didio op cit (n161) at 371. 
170 Hepple op cit (n168) at 153. 
171 Lord Denning to the House of Lords quoted in Hepple op cit (n168) at 153.   
172 Hepple op cit (n168) at 153. 
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the EqpA have since been consolidated with other anti-discrimination laws173 into a 
single piece of legislation – the Equality Act 2010 (“EqA 2010”). 
3.2.1. Statutory provision regulating equal pay or pay discrimination 
In terms of the EqA 2010, a person that claims they are being paid less than a 
comparator because of a ground such as race, religion or belief, disability or sexual 
orientation may bring a claim for direct or indirect discrimination without the need to 
establish that his or her work is the same, substantially the same or of equal value.174  
The law on equality of terms for the same work, like work or work of equal value 
pertains only to equality of terms between the sexes and relating to pregnancy and 
maternity.175 
In terms of Chapter 3 of the EqA, there is an implied equality clause in 
contracts of employment where the employee is performing equal work, like work or 
work that is rated equivalent under a job evaluation study to that of a member of the 
opposite sex.176  The sex equality rule set out in section 66 of the EqA has the 
following effects: 
(i) If a relevant term is less favourable to a complainant than it is to his 
or her comparator, the term is modified so as not to be less 
favourable. 
 
173 For example, the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, the Race Relations Act, 1976 and the Disability 
Discrimination Act, 1995. 
174 Hepple op cit (n168) at 156. 
175 Chapter 3 of the Equality Act, 2010. 
176 Section 65 of the Equality Act, 2010. 
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(ii) If the complainant does not have a term which corresponds to that of 
his or her comparator which benefits the comparator, then the 
complainant’s terms are modified to include such a term. 
Similar provisions are implied into the terms of occupational pension schemes.177  In 
the application of this rule, the House of Lords held that the enquiry is not into 
whether the complainant enjoys, on the whole, not less favourable terms and 
conditions of employment than her comparator.  Rather, each term and condition of 
employment is individually considered.178  As with the EEA, the enforcement of the 
prohibition under the EqA is reliant on  individual complaints.179 
3.2.2. The complainant 
A complainant in an “equal pay” claim is a person in the employment of another.  
This is broadly defined to include inter alia employment under a contract of 
employment, a contract of apprenticeship or a contract personally to do work.180 
3.2.3. Comparator 
As with the EEA, the EqA identifies a statutorily defined comparator.  In this regard, 
the sex equality rule applies in circumstances where a person (“A”) is employed on 
work that is equal to the work that a comparator of the opposite sex (“B”).181  B is a 
comparator for purposes of Chapter 3 of the EqA if: 
 
177 Section 67 of the Equality Act, 2010. 
178 Laubscher supra n133 at 810.  See also Hayward v Cammel Laird Shipbuilders Ltd (No.2), [1988] 
A.C. 894 at 904B-C and St Helens NHS Trust v Brownhill and others 2011 IRLR 815. 
179 Sandra Fredman ‘Reforming equal pay laws’ (2008) 37 Industrial Law Journal 193 at 210. 
180 Section 83(2) of the Equality Act, 2010. 
181 Section 64(1)(a) of the Equality act, 2010. 
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(i) He is employed by A’s employer or by an associate182 of A’s 
employer; and A and B work at the same establishment. 
(ii) B is employed by A’s employer or an associate of A’s employer; B 
works at an establishment other than the one at which A works; and 
common terms apply at the establishments (either generally or as 
between A and B). 
Therefore, unlike the EEA, in terms of the EqA employees in a multinational 
or group of companies may be able to institute a claim in terms of this provision if 
his or her comparator is employed by a related entity.  Furthermore, section 64(2) of 
the EqA clearly stipulates that the comparison between an applicant and the 
comparator need not be contemporaneous.  Thus, it is possible for a complainant to 
identify a predecessor or successor as a comparator for a claim under the EqA.183 
3.2.4. The meaning of equal work 
In terms of section 65(1) of the EqA, the work of A is “equal” to that of B if it is (i) 
like B’s work; (ii) rated as equivalent to B’s work; or (iii) of equal value to B’s 
work. 
Work is “like” if the work undertaken by A and B are the same or broadly 
similar, and the differences in their work is not of practical importance in relation to 
the terms of their work.184  It is therefore necessary when conducting a comparison 
 
182 In terms of section 79(9) of the EqA, employers are associated if one is a company which the other 
directly or indirectly has control; or both are companies of which a third person directly or indirectly 
has control. 
183 T Laubscher ‘Equal pay for equal work – a South African perspective’ (2016) 37 ILJ 804 at 813. 
184 Section 65(2) of the Equality Act, 2010. 
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of the work undertaken by A and B to have regard to the frequency with which 
differences between their work occur, as well as the nature and the extent of such 
differences.185  A’s work is rated as equivalent to that of B if a job evaluation study 
gives an equal value to A and B’s jobs in terms of demands made on the employee or 
would give an equal value to their jobs in those terms were the evaluation not made 
on a system which values the demands on men different to those it sets for 
woman.186  Finally, A’s work is considered equal in value to B’s work if it is neither 
like B’s work nor rated as equivalent to B’s work but is nevertheless equal to B’s 
work if regard is had to the demands on A by reference to factors such as effort, skill 
and decision-making.187 
The job evaluation system adopted by an employer to determine the value of 
work as discussed above is required to withstand rigorous testing against factors 
such as the thoroughness in its analysis, objectivity, transparency, accuracy, internal 
soundness, consistency, sufficient detail and fairness.188  
3.2.5. Defences 
In terms of section 69 of the EqA, the sex equality clause has no effect if the 
employer is able to show that the difference between A and B’s terms of 
employment are because of reliance on a material factor, that is, a material difference 
between A and B’s case, which does not involve treating A less favourably than B 
because of A’s sex; and if the factor is a proportionate means of achieving a 
 
185 Section 65(3) of the Equality Act, 2010. 
186 Sections 65(4) and 65(5) of the Equality Act, 2010. 
187 Section 65(5) of the Equality Act, 2010. 
188 See Armstrong and others v Glasgow City Council [2017] IRLR 993 which identified these factors 
as relevant to an assessment of whether a job evaluation system complies with section 1(5) of the 
EqpA. 
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legitimate aim.189  The reduction of inequality between men and women’s terms of 
work is always regarded as a legitimate aim.190 
3.2.6. Remedies 
Remedies for a successful claim of contractual pay discrimination include an order 
that the applicant’s pay be raised to that of his or her comparator; the beneficial term 
in the comparator’s contract of employment which was not conferred on the 
applicant be inserted into his or her contract; compensation in the form of back-pay 
or damages.191 
3.3. Canada 
Canada ratified the United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights192 in 1976.  State parties to this treaty recognise the right of everyone 
to remuneration which provides, as a minimum, fair wages and equal remuneration 
for work of equal value without distinction of any kind.193  Following this 
ratification, Canada was enjoined to take steps to progressively realise the rights 
recognised in the Covenant by inter alia the adoption of legislative measures.194  In 
compliance with its obligations under this Covenant, by the mid-1980s Canada 
 
189 Section 69 of the Equality Act, 2010. 
190 Section 69(3) of the Equality Act, 2010. 
191 Section 132 of the Equality Act, 2010. 
192 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, A/RES/2200, available at: 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f47924.html [accessed 9 February 2019]. 
193 Part III, Article 7(1)(a). 
194 Article 2(1). 
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recognised equal pay for equal work as a ‘fundamental right’ and equal pay 
legislation was passed by the federal government as well as most provinces.195   
Canadian “equal pay” legislation can be broadly categorised into the 
following categories (i) laws that guarantee equal pay for equal work; (ii) laws that 
require equal pay for work of equal value; and (iii) laws that prohibit, in general 
terms, unequal treatment in an employment context.196  This dissertation will limit its 
assessment to the federal legislation and that of the province of Ontario that require 
equal pay for work of equal value. 
3.3.1. Statutory provision that requires equal pay for work of equal value 
Section 11 of the Canadian Human Rights Act (“CHRA”)197 provides that it is a 
‘discriminatory practice’ for an employer to establish or maintain differences in 
wages between male and female employees that are employed in the same 
establishment and who perform work of equal value.  For purposes of this section, 
“wages” is a term broader than salary and includes commissions, vacation pay, 
dismissal wages, bonuses, the value of board, rent or housing, payments in kind, 
contributions to pension funds, long-term disability plans and health insurance plans, 
as well as ‘any other advantage received directly or indirectly from the individual’s 
employer’.198 
Section 11 of the CHRA recognises that it is not a discriminatory practice to 
pay male and female employees different wages if the difference is based on a factor 
 
195 Sydney Kruth ‘A case for Canadian pay equity reform’ [i] 2014 5 W. J. Legal Stud. at 6. 
196 Kruth op cit (n195) at 7. 
197 Canadian Human Rights Act R.S.C., 1985, c.H-6.   
198 Section 11(7) of the Canadian Human Rights Act. 
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recognised by the guidelines issued by the Canadian Human Rights Commission to 
be a reasonable factor justifying such differentiation.199  The Equal Wage Guidelines 
(“Guidelines”) recognise factors similar to those set out in the Employment Equity 
Regulations, 2014 as justifiable reasons for differentiation such as inter alia a 
difference in performance ratings, seniority, demotion, downgrading of the role, 
reclassification of a role, and the existence of an internal labour shortage.200  
Ontario’s Employment Standards Act (“ESA”)201 seeks to ensure that men 
and women receive equal pay for performing substantially the same job.  In this 
regard, it prohibits an employer from paying an employee of one sex at a rate of pay 
less than the rate of another of the other sex in circumstances where (i) the 
employees perform substantially the same kind of work in the same establishment; 
(ii) their performance requires substantially the same skill, effort and responsibility; 
and (iii) their work is performed under similar working conditions.202  The 
exceptions to this general prohibition are set out in section 42(2) of the ESA which 
provides that the prohibition does not apply when the difference in the rate of pay is 
made on the basis of a seniority or merit system, a system that measures earnings by 
quantity or quality of production or any other factor other than sex.  Section 42(3) 
prohibits an employer from reducing an employee’s rate of pay in order to comply 
with the provisions of section 42(1).   
 
199 Section 11(4) of the Canadian Human Rights Act. 
200 Paragraph 16 of the Equal Wages Guidelines, 1986 SOR/86-1082.   
201 Employment Standards Act, 2000, SO 2000, c 41. 
202 Section 42(1) of the Employment Standards Act. 
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Ontario’s Pay Equity Act (“PEA”)203 seeks to ensure that men and women 
receive equal pay for work that is of equal value, albeit different.  Unlike the 
provisions of the CHRA and ESA which are enforced through a complaint process, 
the PEA requires employers with more than ten employees to proactively address 
pay disparities by inter alia comparing jobs generally done by women to those 
generally done by men using consistent gender-neutral job comparison systems 
which factor in skill, effort, responsibility and working conditions.  Thereafter, an 
employer is obliged to establish and maintain compensation practices that provide 
for pay equity in work of equal or comparable value.204 
3.3.2. The complainant 
Under the CHRA, it is possible for a complaint of pay discrimination to be lodged on 
behalf of an identifiable group provided that the group is predominantly of one sex 
and the comparator group is predominantly of the other sex, as defined in the 
Guidelines.205 
Under the ESA, an employee alleging that the Act has been or is being 
contravened may file a complaint with the Ministry of Labour.206  An Employment 
Standards Officer will then be appointed to investigate the complaint. 
 
203 Pay Equity Act R.S.O. 1990, c. P.7. 
204 Ontario Pay Equity Commission The Pay Equity Act available on 
http://www.payequity.gov.on.ca/en/AboutUs/Pages/the_act.aspx (last accessed 15 January 2018).  See 
also section 7(1) of the Pay Equity Act. 
205 Paragraph 12 of the Equal Wages Guidelines. 
206 Section 96(1) of the Employment Standards Act. 
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3.3.3. Comparator 
For purposes of section 11 of the CHRA, employees of an establishment include 
those that are subject to a common personnel and wage policy, irrespective of any 
collective agreement applicable to them and whether or not this policy is centrally 
administered.207  Two or more locations are considered a single establishment if they 
are in the same municipality or there are common “bumping rights” for at least one 
employee across municipal borders.208  Where separate establishments are 
established or maintained by an employer solely or principally for the purpose of 
establishing or maintaining differences in wages between male and female 
employees, they are deemed to be the same establishment for purposes of founding a 
claim under section 11 of the CHRA.209 
3.3.4. Assessment of work 
In terms of section 11 of the CHRA, when assessing the value of work performed by 
employees in the same establishment, the criteria that will be adopted is composite 
of the skill, effort and responsibility required in the performance of the work and the 
conditions under which the work is performed.210 
For purposes of the ESA, work is considered “substantially the same” if it is 
similar enough to reasonably be considered to fall within the same job classification.  
It is not necessary for the work to be identical in every respect, nor does the work 
 
207 Paragraph 10 of the Equal Wages Guidelines. 
208 Ministry of Labour Your guide to the Employment Standards Act available at 
https://www.ontario.ca/document/your-guide-employment-standards-act-0/equal-pay-equal-work 
(Last accessed 15 January 2018). 
209 Section 11(3) of the Canadian Human Rights Act. 
210 Section 11(2) of the Canadian Human Rights Act. 
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need to be interchangeable.211  When assessing whether work requires substantially 
the same skill, one is required to consider the ‘degree or amount of knowledge, 
physical or motor capability needed by the employee performing the job’.212  
“Effort” is measured with reference to the physical or mental exertion needed to 
perform the job, whereas responsibility is measured by the number and the nature of 
an employee’s work obligations, degree of accountability, and the degree of 
authority exercised by the employee in the performance of the work.  When 
comparing employees’ working conditions, one is required to consider factors such 
as exposure to the elements, health and safety hazards in the workplace, and hours of 
work.213 
3.3.5. Remedies 
The remedies available under the CHRA214  include inter alia orders to cease the 
discrimination and take measures to prevent recurrence; compensate the applicant 
for wages and expenses; and/or damages. 
In terms of section 42(5) of the ESA, where an Employment Standards 
Officer finds that an employer has contravened subsection (1), the officer may 
determine the amount owing to an employee as a result of the contravention and that 
amount shall be deemed to be unpaid wages for that employee.  The employer may 
then be ordered to pay the unpaid wages to the employee.215 
 
211 Ministry of Labour Your guide to the Employment Standards Act available at 
https://www.ontario.ca/document/your-guide-employment-standards-act-0/equal-pay-equal-work 
(Last accessed 15 January 2018). 
212 Ibid. 
213 Your guide to the Employment Standards Act op cit (n211). 
214 Section 53(2) and (3) of the Canadian Human Rights Act. 
215 Section 103 of the Employment Standards Act. 
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3.4. United States of America 
In the United States of America, the right of employees not to be discriminated 
against in relation to their compensation is regulated under various federal laws.216  
The assessment in this paper will however be limited to the Equal Pay Act 1963 
(“Equal Pay Act”) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 1964 (“Title VII”). 
3.4.1. Statutory framework 
The Equal Pay Act came into effect on 11 June 1964 and forms part of the 
Fair Labour Standards Act 1938 (as amended) incorporated in the compilation of 
general and permanent federal statutes known as the United States Code.   The 
Equal Pay Act was intended as ‘broad charter of women’s rights in the economic 
field’ seeking to ‘overcome the age-old belief in women’s inferiority and to 
eliminate the depressing effects on living standards of reduced wages for female 
workers and the economic and social consequences which flow from it’.217 
Pursuant to the Equal Pay Act, the Fair Labour Standards Act provides that 
no employer may discriminate between employees on the basis of sex by paying 
wages to employees in an establishment at a rate less than at which it pays 
employees of the opposite sex for equal work on jobs that require equal skill, effort 
and responsibility and which are performed under similar working conditions.218  
The exceptions to this general position is where payment is made pursuant to a 
seniority system, a merit system, a system which measures earnings by quantity or 
 
216 This includes the Equal Pay Act 1963, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 1964, Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act, 1967 and Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 1990. 
217 Schultz v American Can Company -Dixie Products 424 F.2d 356 at 360 (8th Cir. 1970). 
218 Section 206(d)(1) of the Fair Labour Standards Act. 
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quality of production, or a differential based on any other factor other than sex.219  
As with Ontario’s ESA, an employer may not reduce an employee’s rate of pay in 
order to comply with this section.  
Title VII is broader in scope than the Equal Pay Act insofar as it makes it an 
“unlawful practice” for an employer to discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his or her compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment 
because of that individual’s race, colour, religion, sex or national origin.  It only 
applies to employers with fifteen or more employees.  What is commonly referred to 
as the Bennett Amendment inserted an exception to the general principle of the pay 
equity in Title VII similar to that set out in the Equal Pay Act.  In this regard, the 
Bennett Amendment provided that it is not an unlawful practice for an employer to 
apply different standards of compensation or differed terms, conditions or privileges 
of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, a system which 
measures earning by quantity or quality of production or to employees at different 
locations.  This exception is subject to the condition that the differences are not a 
result of an intention to discriminate on one of the listed grounds.  It is furthermore 
not an unlawful practice to give or act upon the results of a professionally developed 
ability test, provided that the test is not designed, intended to or used to discriminate 
on a listed ground.220 
 
219 Section 206(d)(1) of the Fair Labour Standards Act. 
220 Section 2000(h) of Title VII. 
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3.4.2. Establishing a claim 
In order to found a claim for a breach of Title VII, a plaintiff need not demonstrate 
that he or she performed equal work to his or her comparator.221  Rather, a plaintiff 
need only establish that he or she occupied a job “similar” to that of the higher paid 
comparator.222  Once a prima facie case has been established, the burden then shifts 
to the employer to prove that there is a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the 
pay disparity.223  If the employer is able to demonstrate this, the plaintiff will then 
need to establish that, regardless of the reasons advanced by the employer, the 
employer intentionally discriminated against him or her. 
Unlike with claims under Title VII, in a claim under the Equal Pay Act an 
employee need not establish that the employer acted with discriminatory intent.224  In 
order to establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff is required to demonstrate that the 
work performed is substantially equal to that of the identified comparator if regard is 
had to (i) the skills, duties, supervision, effort and responsibilities of the job; (ii) the 
work conditions of the plaintiff and her comparator were the same; and (iii) the 
comparator was paid more in the circumstances.225  Once a prima facie case is 
established on the Equal Pay Act, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to show 
that the pay disparity was due to one of the four legitimate reasons referred to above.   
 
221 County of Washington v Gunther 452 U.S. 161, 161, 168-171, 180-181, 68 L. Ed. 2d 751, 1010 S. 
Ct. 2242 (1981). 
222 Sprague v Thom Ams, 129 F.3d 1355 (10th Cir. 1997) (“Sprague”) at 1363. 
223 Sprague supra (n222). 
224 Sinclair v Automobile Club of Oklahoma, Inc. 733 F.2d 726, 729 (10th Cir. 1984). 
225 Mickelson v New York Life Ins. Co. 460 F.3d 1304, 1311 n.5 (10th Cir. 2006). 
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3.4.3. Remedies 
If an employer is found to have violated the provisions of the Equal Pay Act, it may 
be liable to the employee for unpaid wages and an equal amount in liquidated 
damages, as well as costs.226  Furthermore, an employer may be required to increase 
the complainant’s pay in order to match that of the comparator. 
A successful plaintiff in a Title VII pay discrimination claim may be entitled 
to recover back-pay, compensatory damages, punitive damages, front pay (that is, 
anticipated future damages resulting from the discrimination) and costs.227   
 
226 Title 29 United States Code at section 206. 
227 Title 42 United States Code, Chapter 21 at section 1981. 
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4. LIMITATIONS OF THE STATUTORILY DEFINED COMPARATOR IN THE 
EEA 
4.1. Introduction 
By prohibiting employers from providing employees that perform the same work, 
similar work or work of equal value with different terms and conditions of 
employment because of protected characteristics or arbitrary grounds, the EEA gives 
effect to the concept of formal equality which requires that like cases be treated 
alike.228   
Where an employer treats similarly-situated employees alike in relation to 
their terms and conditions of employment or in instances where there are no 
similarly-situated employees of a comparative group treated more favourably, there 
can be no finding of discrimination under section 6(4) of the EEA.  It is therefore a 
prerequisite for the success of a claim under this statutory provision that a 
comparator be identified.229 
As set out in chapter 2, the comparator that must be produced by a 
complainant in a claim under section 6(4) of the EEA is statutorily defined as (i) an 
employee; (ii) of the same employer as the complainant; (iii) that performs the same 
work, substantially similar work or work of equal value to the complainant.  The 
paragraphs that follow demonstrate that the requirement to produce a comparator as 
 
228 That said, Regulation 7(f) of the Employment Equity Regulations, 2014, which identifies the 
existence of a shortage of relevant skill or the market value in a particular job classification as a 
possible factor justifying a differentiation in terms and conditions of employment, seems to recognise 
that formal equality has its limitations.  This defence would allow the appointment of, for example, an 
African female engineer at a higher salary because of her market value.  
229 Mangena and Others v Fila South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Others (2010) 31 ILJ 662 (LC) at para 6. 
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defined acts as a limitation on the efficacy of section 6(4) of the EEA meeting its 
stated objective of giving effect to the constitutional right to equality.230 
4.2. The need to produce the correct comparator at the outset 
The Labour Court has held on numerous occasions that a mere allegation of 
disparate treatment is insufficient to establish a valid cause of action in a claim of 
unfair discrimination.231  Rather, it is incumbent on the complainant to allege (and 
later prove) that the disparate treatment exists because of a prohibited ground and the 
discrimination is relative to another person, that is, a comparator must be identified.  
Thus, a failure to identify a comparator in a pleaded case may be fatal to a claim.  
Take for example the case of Simmadari v ABSA Bank Limited232 where the 
applicant’s claim of inter alia alleged unfair discrimination on the grounds of race 
was dismissed pursuant to an exception to her pleadings.  In assessing the 
articulation of the applicant’s cause of action in her statement of case, the Labour 
Court found that she had merely alleged differentiation on the grounds of race but 
failed to identify a comparator at the outset in her pleaded case.  Instead, a specific 
comparator was identified only in the pre-trial minute.  Accordingly, the court held 
that the complainant’s claim under the EEA did not disclose a valid cause of 
action.233   
 
230 Isaac Joory ‘Arguments against the politicized role of comparators in article 14 discrimination cases’ 
5 Cambridge Student L. Rev. (2009) at 40.  See also Suzanne B. Goldberg ‘Discrimination by 
comparison’ 120 Yale Law Journal 728 (2010-2011) at 751. 
231 Bayete supra (n138) at 1119A-B.  Ntai supra (n135) at 218F.   
232 Simmadari v ABSA Bank Limited (2018) 39 ILJ 1819 (LC) (“Simmadari”). 
233 Simmadari supra (n232) at 1834H to 1835A.  See also Mzobe & others and Fencerite (Pty) Ltd 
(2016) 37 ILJ 1767 (CCMA). 
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As explained in section 2.2.2 above, a claim of unfair discrimination in terms 
of section 6(4) of the EEA requires a complainant to allege and provide that there is 
a difference in terms and conditions of employment between his or her and the 
comparator, that is, an employee of the same employer performing (i) the same; (ii) 
substantially the same work; or (iii) work of equal value.  In order to ensure that a 
statement of case is not excipiable, it will be necessary for a complainant to set out 
the facts which sustain the conclusion that disparate treatment exists, this disparate 
treatment is because of a ground listed in section 6(1) of the EEA and that he or she 
performs the same work, substantially the same work or work of equal value to that 
of the chosen comparator.  While seemingly clear requirements, cases of 
discrimination often ‘begin from emotionally charged but inartfully pled complaints, 
which are built upon mistaken legal foundations and then hindered by the plaintiff’s 
ineffective investigations into relevant circumstances’.234    
As Fredman pointed out, the most relevant information to an equal pay claim 
lies in the hands of an employer.235  While section 78(1)(b) of the BCEA accords 
employees the right to discuss their terms and conditions of employment with fellow 
employees, the likelihood of an individual complainant sourcing and obtaining 
sufficient information on the extent of pay disparities from her comparator is limited, 
particularly given the allegation of discrimination.  Given that there is no pre-
litigation discovery or means of subpoenaing information for purposes of pleading, it 
becomes increasingly difficult for a complainant to correctly identify a comparator 
 
234 Brian D. Patterson ‘The jurisprudence of discrimination as opposed to simple inequality in the 
international service’ (2007) GA J Int’l & Comp L 36(1) at 25. 
235 Fredman op cit (n179) at 207. 
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doing similar work or work of equal value. 236  As pointed out by Goldberg, ‘the 
evaluation of jobs is an immensely complex task which fortunes have been made by 
firms of consultants’.237  The average complainant approaching the CCMA or the 
Labour Court for recourse in a section 6(4) dispute is unlikely to have the resources 
to pursue (or the cooperation of the employer to participate in) a job evaluation 
system in anticipation of litigation.  In the absence of ‘detailed analyses of the skill, 
knowledge and responsibilities demanded by each job [identified in a claim] and the 
working conditions under which it is performed’238 the ability of a complainant to 
correctly identify the correct comparator at the inception of a section 6(4) claim is 
compromised. 
Further, the concepts of “same”, “similar work” and “work of equal value” 
are mutually exclusive and, without artfully drafted pleadings, it is not open for the 
complainant to use the safety net of alternative grounds for establishing a claim 
under section 6(4) of the EEA.239  Attempting to hinge one’s bet on one of the 
comparisons being legitimate would result in a challenge to the formulation of a 
claim at the inception of the dispute.   
With this problem in mind, in order to ensure that the majority of section 6(4) 
discrimination cases are not stillborn at the conceptual stages of the litigation, the 
possible solution would be to permit the CCMA or the Labour Court to disregard the 
complainant’s choice of comparator once the discovery stages of the litigation 
 
236 Pre-action “discovery” may however be available in terms of section 50 of the Promotion of Access 
to Information Act 2 of 2000.  See Fredman op cit (n179). 
237 Goldberg op cit (n230) at 271. 
238 Goldberg op cit (n230) at 271. 
239 Mangena and others v Fila South Africa (Pty) Limited supra (n229) para 15. 
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reveals the chosen comparator to not be a true comparator, and to construct a 
hypothetical comparator against which it will consider whether there is evidence to 
support the contention that the granting of terms and conditions of employment to 
the complainant was tainted by a ground set out in section 6(1) of the EEA.  This is 
the example adopted by the United Kingdom following the Court of Appeal decision 
of Balamoody v United Kingdom Central Council for Nursing, Midwifery and 
Health Visiting.240  In Balamoody the complainant was a State Registered Nurse who 
was removed from the register of nurses on account of misconduct relating to drug 
management.  The complainant sought to have his name restored to the register and, 
in doing so, complained that the matron of the nursing home, a white lady, was 
guilty of misconduct and responsible for the matters for which he had been 
convicted.  The allegations against the matron were later investigated and she was 
found not guilty of any offences.  The complainant’s request for the restoration of his 
name to the registrar was therefore denied. 
Subsequently, the complainant initiated a claim of unlawful race 
discrimination against the decision-making health authority.  These claims were 
dismissed by the Employment Tribunal as frivolous and of no substance given the 
absence of a true comparator being identified (that is, no one else had been found 
guilty of any offences) to establish a prima facie case.241  The Employment Appeal 
Tribunal considered whether the Employment Tribunal ought to have utilised a 
hypothetical comparator when assessing the claim but ultimately concluded that 
because a specific case of discrimination had been made in this instance, there was 
 
240 Balamoody v United Kingdom Central Council For Nursing, Midwifery & Health Visiting [2001] 
EWCA Civ 2097 (6 December 2001) (“Balamoody”). 
241 Balamoody supra (n240) para 23. 
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no need to go through a process of identifying a hypothetical comparator and then 
coming to the conclusion that none such would be appropriate.242 
On appeal from the Employment Appeal Tribunal to the Supreme Court of 
Judicature Court of Appeal (Civil Division), the court found that it was incumbent 
on the Employment Tribunal to construct a hypothetical comparator given the 
possibility that the conclusion that the matron was not guilty of any offences could 
be a result of race discrimination.  In this regard, the court of appeal aligned itself 
with the comments of Lindsay J in Chief Constable of West Yorkshire v Vento243 
that: 
…[w] here there is no evidence as to the treatment of an actual male comparator 
whose position is wholly akin to the applicant's, a tribunal has to construct a 
picture of how a hypothetical male comparator would have been treated in 
comparable surrounding circumstances.  Inferences will frequently need to be 
drawn.  One permissible way of judging a question such as that is to see how 
unidentical but not wholly dissimilar cases were treated in relation to other 
individual cases.  It is not required that a minutely exact actual comparator has 
to be found.  If that were the case then isolated cases of discrimination would 
almost invariably go uncompensated. 
The court of appeal in Balamoody was cautious to point out that not every case 
requires a ‘robustly interventionist’ approach by the Employment Tribunal such that 
it takes on making out a case for a complainant.  Each case ought be assessed on an 
individual basis.244 
While the adoption of a similar approach to claims pursuant to section 6(4) of 
the EEA may assist in the ventilation of legitimate complainants by unsophisticated 
 
242 Balamoody supra (n240) para 27. 
243 See the headnote to Chief Constable of West Yorkshire v Vento [2001] IRLR 124 quoted in 
Balamoody supra (n240) para 60. 
244 Balamoody supra (n240) para 61. 
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litigants, as evident from section 4.5 below, the use of hypothetical comparators 
comes with its own challenges. 
4.3. The requirement that the comparator be an employee employed by the 
same employer 
Given that section 6(4) of the EEA requires the comparator in a discrimination claim 
to be an employee employed by the same employer as the complainant, it is possible 
for employers to avoid liability under this section by arranging their corporate 
structures so that separate entities are established principally for the purpose of 
maintaining differences in terms and conditions of employment between employees 
based on a proscribed or arbitrary ground. 
For example, it is possible for a company to split its operations within a 
group structure such that the labour intensive work is undertaken by employees 
employed by a production company whereas employees undertaking administrative 
and management services are contracted to a separate entity which provides services 
to the production company through a management agreement.  Employees in the 
production company will therefore be precluded from raising a claim of 
discrimination citing an employee in the management company as a comparator.  An 
example of segregating a workforce in separate entities was seen in the case of 
Allonby v Accrington & Rossendale College.245   
In Allonby, 341 part-time lecturers were employed by the Accrington & 
Rossendale College (“College”) under successive one year contracts in terms of 
which their rate of pay was determined by the level at which they were teaching.  By 
 
245 Allonby v Accrington & Rossendale College [2004] IRLR 224 (ECJ) (“Allonby”). 
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1996, legislative changes required part-time lecturers to be accorded equal or 
equivalent benefits to full-time lecturers.  In an effort to reduce its overheads, the 
College elected to terminate or not renew the contracts of part-time lecturers and, 
instead, offered to re-engage them through agencies.  Of the 341 hourly-paid part-
time lecturers who were made redundant by the College in 1996, 110 were men and 
231 were women.  Upon their re-engagement by the College through an agency, the 
part-lecturers’ pay was then determined as a proportion of the fee agreed between the 
agency and the College.   
Following her transfer to an agency, Ms Allonby’s rate of pay was reduced 
and she lost a series of benefits linked to her employment.  Ms Allonby brought a 
claim alleging that the College was discriminating against her as a contract worker 
and that the agency was obliged by law to pay her equally, that is, proportionate to 
the relative difference in the time and value of the work conducted by a full-time 
lecturer at the College. 
Following a referral of the dispute to the Court of Justice of European 
Communities, the court considered whether Article 141(1) of the EC Treaty246 which 
enjoins each Member State to ensure that the principle of equal pay for male and 
female workers for equal work or work of equal value is applied, must be interpreted 
to enable a woman whose contract of employment with an undertaking has not been 
renewed and who is immediately made available to her previous employer through 
another undertaking to provide the same services is entitled to rely on the principle 
of equal pay, using as her comparator a man employed by her previous employer 
 
246 The Treaty establishing the European Community Treaty C325/1 (Consolidated version 2002) 
available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12002E/TXT&from=EN (last accessed 8 January 2019). 
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performing the same work or work of equal value.  Despite the fact that Ms Allonby 
continued to do the same work at the College, albeit through an agency, the court 
concluded that Ms Allonby was not entitled to rely on the principle of equal pay 
using her former male colleagues at the College as a comparator.  The court reasoned 
that the fact that the level of pay received by Ms Allonby is influenced by the 
amount which the College pays the agency is not a sufficient basis for concluding 
that the College and the agency constitute a single source responsible for the 
disparity or which could restore equal treatment.247 
Adopting a narrow approach like the court in Allonby opens the doors for 
unscrupulous employers to deliberately segregate a workforce to avoid the 
application of section 6(4) of the EEA.  Although the South African Labour Courts 
have not hesitated to look beyond the employing legal entity to determine whether 
the contractual arrangements between the parties or the labels they have attached to 
their relationship hide the true status of their relationship in the past,248 I submit that 
a similar approach to the Canadian example of deeming individuals to be employed 
by the same establishment for purposes of founding a claim of discrimination where 
separate establishments are established or maintained by an employer solely or 
principally for maintaining differences in terms and conditions of employment on 
discriminatory grounds ought to have been adopted in the South African context. 
Apart from the above, given the socio-economic impact apartheid has had on 
the South African workforce, it is possible for there to be a homogenous 
 
247 Allonby supra (n245) para 46 to 48. 
248 Laubscher op cit (n133) at 814 and her reference to Unitrans Supply Chain Solutions (Pty) Ltd & 
another v Nampak Glass (Pty) Ltd & others (2014) 35 ILJ 2888 (LC) and TMS Group Industrial 
Services (Pty) Ltd t/a Vericon v Unitrans Supply Chain Solutions (Pty) Ltd (2015) 36 ILJ 197 (LAC). 
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workforce249 amongst a labour intensive production company such that all 
potentially comparable employees share the same personal trait identified as the 
ground for discrimination, for example, race.  Further, employers may also avoid 
liability under section 6(4) by electing to engage the individuals treated more 
favourably as independent contractors.250  Where this occurs, a claim will be 
complicated by the evidentiary burden of first establishing that such arrangements 
are in fact disguised employment relationships.  Given that the need for a comparator 
is codified in section 6(4), in the absence of a comparator, a complainant will not get 
out of the proverbial starting blocks in his or her claim.251 
4.4. The need for the comparator to be contemporaneous 
Landman suggests that in pursuing an equal pay dispute, a complainant’s chosen 
comparator must normally be contemporaneous, that is, ‘doing the same job or a job 
of equal value at the same time’.252  Identifying a contemporaneous comparator in 
large workforces where there are multiple employees engaged in standardised roles 
may pose little difficulty, however, the need for a contemporaneous comparator 
becomes more challenging when one is faced with a specialist workforce where 
employees are categorised into bespoke roles based on their varied competencies or 
at senior or executive levels where there are no multiple incumbents in a particular 
portfolio.253  Requiring a complainant in a claim under section 6(4) of the EEA to 
 
249 Goldberg op cit (n230) at 759. 
250 Sandra Fredman “Background paper for the Working Group on Discrimination against Women in 
Law and Practice (the Working Group): economic and social life” (2013) Anti-discrimination laws 
and work in the developing world: a thematic overview available at 
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Women/WG/ESL/BackgroundPaper2.doc (last accessed 15 
December 2017). 
251 Impala Platinum Ltd v Jonase and Others (2017) 38 ILJ 2754 (LC) at para 13. 
252 Landman op cit (n17) at 346. 
253 Goldberg op cit (n230) at 755. 
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identify a contemporaneous comparator could therefore result in the perpetuation of 
disproportionate pay differentials along the lines of inter alia sex or race. 
One possible way of addressing the challenges faced by a narrow formulation 
of a contemporaneous comparator is to amend section 6(4) of the EEA to specifically 
deal with the issue that a comparator need not be contemporaneous in a manner 
similar to section 64(2) of the EqA.  Section 64(2) of the EqA specifically provides 
that, to rely on the sex equality protections and rights prescribed in sections 66 and 
67 of the EqA, the work undertaken by the comparator need not be done 
contemporaneously with the complainant.  Alternatively, the South African courts 
and tribunals could adopt a generous interpretation of the statutorily defined 
comparator in a manner similar to the European Court in the case of Macarthys Ltd v 
Smith254 where the court permitted the complainant to compare herself to her 
predecessor who had received a higher rate of pay than her or of Diocese of Hallam 
Trustee v Connaughton255 where the United Kingdom Employment Tribunal 
permitted a complainant to use her immediate successor as her comparator given that 
her successor’s contract ‘was so proximate to her own as to render him an effective 
comparator, as effective as if actual’. 
4.5. The absence of a hypothetical comparator 
As set out in section 2.2.4 above, while the Code of Good Practice encourages the 
use of a hypothetical comparator256 where there are no comparable male-dominated 
 
254 Macarthys Ltd v Smith 1980 ICR 672. 
255 Diocese of Hallam Trustee v Connaughton [1996] IRLR 505 at para 15. 
256 Paragraphs 6.4 and 6.5 of the Code of Good Practice. 
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jobs to female-dominated jobs within an employer’s organisation, the plain wording 
of section 6(4) of the EEA contemplates an actual comparator.   
The use of a hypothetical comparator as suggested by the Code of Good 
Practice would enhance a complainant’s ability to found a claim at an organisation 
where systematic discrimination may make it difficult to establish differential 
treatment that meets the section 6(4) test, similar to the experience in the case of 
County of Washington v Gunther in the United States of America.257  In Gunther, the 
respondents were employed as guards in the female section of a jail who filed a suit 
under Title VII alleging inter alia that they had been paid less than the male guards 
in the male section of the jail.  The District Court dismissed the claim given that it 
failed to satisfy the “equal work” standard of the Equal Pay Act.  On appeal, 
however, the Supreme Court of the United States recognised that requiring sex-based 
wage discrimination claims to satisfy the “equal work” standard of the Equal Pay 
Act would ‘mean that a woman who is discriminatorily underpaid could obtain no 
relief – no matter how egregious the discrimination might be – unless her employer 
also employed a man in an equal job in the same establishment, at a higher rate of 
pay’.  The Supreme Court went further to suggest that an adoption of the reasoning 
advanced by the District Court and petitioner on appeal would also mean that a 
woman employed in a unique position at a company would not be able to obtain 
legal redress even if her employer admitted that her salary would have been higher 
had she been a man.258 
 
257 County of Washington v Gunther 452 U.S. 161 (1981). 
258 County of Washington v Gunther supra (n257) 178 and 179. 
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Although permitting the use of a hypothetical comparator would allow for 
greater scope to address pay discrimination by challenging societal prejudices and 
structural norms, I am hesitant to propose the removal of the legislative requirement 
for a comparator to establish a claim under section 6(4) of the EEA.  Firstly, 
‘[r]emoving the comparator would make it harder to ascribe actions to inequitable 
treatment based on a protected characteristic’.259  Secondly, the benefit of an actual 
comparator allows for a court or tribunal to engage with empirical evidence of 
differentiation rather than making assumptions or judgments based on sociological 
analyses.260  This would avoid allegations of the courts showing little deference to 
the managerial prerogative exercised by employers and ‘using their powers to 
institutionali[s]e their own social views into legal mandates’.261  Thirdly, the costs of 
pursuing a claim of discrimination in terms of section 6(4) of the EEA premised on a 
comparison with a hypothetical comparator would inevitably escalate as the need for 
expert evidence to explain how stereotypes operate to the disadvantage of the 
complainant and to the advantage of the hypothetical comparator. 
Accordingly, I would propose that, similar to the outcome of the consultation 
of the Equality Bill in the United Kingdom, our courts and tribunals retain flexibility 
on whether there is a need for an actual comparator on a case by case basis.262 
 
259 The Equality Bill – Government response to the consultation’, July 2008 (Cm 7454) at [7.10] 
available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/238
707/7454.pdf (last accessed 6 January 2018). 
260 Goldberg op cit (n230) at 793. 
261 Goldberg op cit (n230) at 793. 
262 The Equality Bill – Government response to the consultation’, July 2008 (Cm 7454) at [7.10]. 
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5. SOME CRITICISMS OF THE REGULATED METHODOLOGY FOR 
ASSESSING WORK OF EQUAL VALUE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Complaints premised on work being the same or substantially the same in 
that they may be considered interchangeable permits the use of a relatively 
uncomplicated exercise of cross-checking employees’ key areas of responsibility, 
competency and requirements for their roles.  The more problematic scenario is a 
complaint premised on the work of the complainant and the comparator being of 
equal value. 
The Employment Equity Regulations, 2014 set out a methodology to be 
employed when assessing whether work is of equal value.  This requires an objective 
evaluation of the roles of the complainant and comparator having regard to the 
factors set out in Regulation 6(1)(a) to (d) which include (i) the responsibility 
demanded of the work; (ii) the skills, qualifications, prior learning and experience 
required to perform the work; (iii) the physical, mental and emotional effort required 
to perform the work; and (iv) the conditions under which work is performed, to the 
extent relevant.  Evident from these factors, the Employment Equity Regulations, 
2014 prescribe that it is the content and characteristics of a particular job as opposed 
to the personal characteristics of the incumbents or operational requirements of the 
employer that ought to be compared. 
Notably, the Employment Equity Regulations, 2014 fail to provide any 
guidance on the extent to which critical areas of dispute in the evaluation of jobs 
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ought to be approached.263  For example, to what extent should the physical effort 
required to perform the work be balanced with the mental effort associated with the 
exertion of a particular set of skills?  How are these factors to be measured?  Is 
expert evaluation of these factors required when a comparison is being conducted or 
is the mere say-so of the employer or a consulting party sufficient?  Regrettably, the 
Code of Good Practice provides no further elucidation on these issues, merely stating 
that ‘[t]he weighting attached to each of these factors may vary depending on the 
sector, employer and the job concerned. These factors do not constitute any 
particular preference in respect of weighting allocation.’264  The other glaring 
omission in the methodology prescribed in the Employment Equity Regulations, 
2014 and guidelines outlined in the Code of Good Practice is the frequency of the 
assessments.265   
The consequences of the above include that the employer is seemingly free to 
decide how to quantify the factors, a possible lack of uniformity in the 
implementation of job evaluations within a workplace, the continued application of 
an outdated evaluation as a means of legitimising discrepancies in terms and 
 
263 Bourne and Whitmore cited in Laubscher op cit (n133) at 816 caution that courts should not make 
a ‘too minute an examination’ or ‘place emphasis upon trivial distinctions which…are not likely to be 
reflected in the [employees’] terms and conditions of employment.  For example, in Shields v Coomes 
Holdings Ltd [1978] IRLR 263 cited in Laubscher op cit (n133) at 816 it was held that a comparison 
should not be made of the contractual difference in the complainant and comparator’s contracts but 
rather the responsibility and work actually undertaken between the employees and the frequency with 
which they are done. 
264 Code of Good Practice, para 5.6. 
265 See Eaton Limited v Nuttall [1977] ICR 272 at 277H cited in Thomson v Diageo plc [2004] All ER 
(D) 86 (Jun) EAT which found that a ‘valid job evaluation study’ would be a test that is thorough in 
its analysis and capable of impartial application such that it should be possible, ‘by applying the 
study, to arrive at the position of a particular employee at a particular point in a particular salary grade 
without taking other matters into account except those unconnected with the nature of the work.’  
Phillips P went on to find that a job evaluation study which requires ‘management to make a 
subjective judgment concerning the nature of the work before the employee can be fitted into the 
appropriate place in the appropriate salary grade, would seem to us not to be a valid study…’. 
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conditions of employment and the ex post facto moderation of weighting of factors 
once an employer has had sight of the case articulated by a complainant.  It is also 
likely that there is only a real resolution of these substantive queries through a 
protracted litigation process.   
In addition to the criteria referred to above, Regulation 6(2) of Employment 
Equity Regulations, 2014 provides that any other factor indicating the value of work 
may be taken into account in evaluating work, provided that the employer shows that 
the factor is relevant to the assessment.  No further guidance is provided by either 
the Employment Equity Regulations, 2014 or the Code of Good Practice as to what 
would render a factor as relevant to the assessment.  This is possibly an attempt by 
the legislature to avoid the challenges of prescribing a “one size fits all” approach 
and impinging on an employer’s prerogative to determine what considerations are 
relevant to its specific business considerations.  However, I submit that a failure to 
provide guidelines as to what would be considered relevant to an assessment of the 
value of work provides scope for the application of employer subjectivity and 
consequently the possible perpetuation of an underestimation of worth of jobs and 
engendered stereotypes within an organisation. 
Although one of the Code of Good Practice’s stated objectives is to 
encourage employers to manage remuneration policies and practices through inter 
alia proper consultation processes, there is no requirement that the evaluation of the 
value of work be through a consultative or collective process.266  The extent to which 
employees and their representatives are involved in the assessment of work is 
therefore at the discretion of the employer.  In my submission, the absence of a 
 
266 Code of Good Practice, para 1.3. 
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requirement that there be a consultative process in the assessment of the value of 
work is a missed opportunity to create further legitimacy for the exercise of an 
employer’s discretionary powers in the assessment of the value of work in its 
organisation and consequential application of policies regulating terms and 
conditions of employment.267  Further, employee participation in the evaluation 
process would result in increased awareness and understanding of the requirements 
of various roles within an organisation which not only limits the scope of an 
employer implementing discriminatory means of evaluation, but may also operate to 
reduce the referral of claims premised on ill-informed perceptions of the value of 
work.    
 
267 Marie-Thérèsa Chicha ‘A comparative analysis of promoting pay equity: models and impacts’ 
(Geneva) International Labour Office (2006) available at 
https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm/@declaration/documents/publication/wcms_d
ecl_wp_27_en.pdf (last accessed 6 January 2018) at 54.  
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6. THE PROBLEMATIC SCOPE OF DEFENCES IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
CONTEXT 
6.1. Critique on the scope of defences 
Once a difference in the terms and conditions of employment between a complainant 
and his or her comparator is established, and that the complainant and the 
comparator are found to perform the same work, similar work or work of equal 
value, the question then turns to whether the differentiation is prohibited for a reason 
set out in section 6(1) of the EEA.  The complainant is required to establish a causal 
link between the differentiation and a listed or analogous ground.268  Once this 
causal link is established, the employer is required to justify the discrimination that 
exists. 
Regulation 7 of the Employment Equity Regulations, 2014 prescribes a 
number of factors that could justify the differentiation in treatment.  Where an 
employer relies upon one of the factors enumerated in Regulation 7 to justify the 
differentiation in the terms and conditions of employment between the complainant 
and comparator, it will be required to demonstrate that the factor relied upon caused 
the difference.  One would assume that an employer pleading multiple defences to 
the differentiation would not be permitted to do so as alternative defences in order to 
avoid a rationalisation for its conduct after the fact.  Rather, it would be more 
appropriate for an employer to explain the extent (perhaps expressed as a 
 
268 Section 11 of the EEA.  See Minister of Correctional Services & others v Duma (2017) 38 ILJ 
2487 (LAC) at para 22.  Cekiso and Premier FMCG (Pty) Ltd (2017) 38 ILJ 2615 (CCMA) at para 
18.  In SA Municipal Workers Union and Another v Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality (2016) 37 ILJ 
1203 (LC) the court held that in a wage discrimination claim, the complainant must show a nexus 
between the differentiation on the grounds claimed and her different treatment, which excludes other 
reasonable inferences.  See also Laubscher op cit n133 at 809. 
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percentage) to which the differentiation in terms and conditions of employment can 
be attributed to each of the defences relied upon.   
Having regard to the scope of the defences, it is arguable that the legislature 
maintained a significant degree of deference to employer prerogative, particularly 
when regard is had to the fact that reliance can be legitimately placed on more 
subjective factors such as performance, competence, potential and market value of 
an employee’s skills.  Permitting reliance on these factors arguably means that 
disparate treatment may always be attributed to seemingly non-discriminatory 
reasons.  Some of these factors are discussed in detail below. 
6.2. Seniority 
Similar to the United States of America, the Employment Equity Regulations, 2014 
do not require a formal seniority system in the workplace (for example, as agreed in 
a collective agreement) before reliance can be placed on this defence.269  However, 
undoubtedly, an employer must be able to identify the factors used to measure 
seniority and that these factors are uniformly and consistently applied. 
The defence of seniority was raised by the respondent in the case of Ntai v 
South African Breweries Ltd.270  The three black male applicants were employed by 
the respondent as trainers in its training institute together with two white males.  The 
applicants alleged that their employer’s practice of paying them lower salaries than 
their white counterparts performing the same work constituted unfair race 
discrimination and accordingly constituted a residual unfair labour practice as 
 
269 See EEOC Whitin Mach. Works, 699 F.2d 688, 689 (4th Cir. 1983) where the seniority system 
defence was permitted despite there being no formal system in place. 
270 Ntai supra (n135). 
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contemplated in item 2(1)(a) of Schedule 7 to the LRA.271  While the respondent 
admitted that there was difference in the employees’ salaries which was significant, 
it denied that the difference was based on or caused by race.  Rather, the respondent 
relied on (i) a series of performance-based pay increments; (ii) the greater experience 
of the comparators; and (iii) their seniority to justify the differentiation.272  Having 
considered the evidence before it, the court was satisfied that the pay differentials 
between the employees could be attributed to the remuneration history of the 
comparators, namely the regrading of their jobs in 1992, their seniority/experience 
and accumulative performance related increases.  In the absence of a significant 
challenge to the evidence presented by the respondent or evidence to establish that 
the alleged unwillingness on the part of the respondent to close the pay gap was 
related to or based on race , the court found no basis upon which it could 
‘legitimately interfere’ with the decision of the respondent.273  Accordingly, the court 
found that there was no merit in the contention that the size of the pay gap was 
caused by race. Ntai demonstrates the continued deference by our courts to the 
exercise of employer prerogative in instances where a clear case of the abuse thereof 
has not been established.274  
 
271 Ntai supra (n135) para 2. 
272 Ntai supra (n135) para 25. 
273 Ntai supra (n135) para 62. 
274 See also Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd v Workers Against Regression and Others (2016) 37 ILJ 2872 
(LC) at 2881F-G where the court held that ‘[n]othing in the EEA precludes an employer from 
adopting and applying a rule in terms of which newly appointed employees start at a rate lower than 
existing long-serving employees.’  Compare this to Ndlela & others v Philani Mega Spar (2016) 37 
ILJ 277 (CCMA) where the employer offered a provident fund to all of its employees once they had 
completed five years' service with it in an effort to retain employees.  The Commissioner found that, 
in the absence of empirical or objective evidence that the benefit would result in staff retention, the 
differentiation based on seniority was arbitrary and unfair. She therefore held that the employer had 
unfairly discriminated against the applicant employees. 
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While the application of the facially neutral seniority system has long been 
embraced as a means of limiting employer prerogative in the allocation of benefits 
and pay, cognisance must be given to the possibility of its application unintentionally 
perpetuating past discriminatory employment practices, particularly given the 
barriers to employment previously facing black people in South Africa, as well as 
women.275  Accordingly, I propose that the defence of seniority or length of service 
to justify differentiation in terms and conditions of employment of employees 
performing the same or similar work or work of equal value be scrutinised with 
reference to inter alia the history of the industry in which the employer operates, the 
historical composition of the workforce and barriers to employment facing members 
of designated groups prior to concluding the operation of the seniority system is fair 
and neutral. 
6.3. Performance 
In terms of Regulation 7(1)(c) of the Employment Equity Regulations, 2014, an 
employer may rely on the respective performance of a complainant and the 
comparator to justify a differentiation in terms and conditions of employment.  The 
only prescribed limitation on this defence is that the employees must be equally 
subject to the performance evaluation system and the performance evaluation system 
must be consistently applied.  Therefore, significant scope for the application of 
managerial prerogative when evaluating performance remains.  In this regard, there 
is no express limitation on the adoption of a performance evaluation system that 
places reliance on the subjective assessments by different supervisors who may have 
 
275 Stephen Utz ‘New Definition of Seniority System Violations under Title VII: He Who Seeks 
Equity...’ (1977-1978) 56 Tex L Rev 301. 
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different management styles.  Further, there is no express requirement in the 
Employment Equity Regulations, 2014 that there be a proportionate correlation 
between employee performance evaluations and the discrepancy in pay. 
In order to mitigate against a possible abuse of managerial prerogative in 
justifying pay differentials based on performance, I propose that closer scrutiny be 
given to performance evaluation systems that do not rely solely on objective criteria 
for the assessment of an employee’s performance.  Further, the approach of the 
United States circuit courts that a ‘merit system must be an organi[s]ed and 
structured procedure whereby employees are evaluated systematically according to 
predetermined criteria’ and ‘employees must be aware of the merit system and the 
merit system must not be gender based’ or based on any other listed or arbitrary 
ground ought to be applied when determining the appropriateness of this defence 
when considered against the State’s objective when introducing section 6(4) of the 
EEA.276 
6.4. Shortage of skills and market value 
Regulation 7(f) of the Employment Equity Regulations, 2014 permits reliance on 
inter alia the shortage of relevant skills or the market value of a particular job 
classification as a factor that would justify a difference in terms and conditions of 
employment.  Reliance on market value or a skills shortage has been recognised in 
other jurisdictions as an objectively justifiable ground for unequal pay.277   
 
276 See Rdyuchowski v Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 203 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2000) and 
the circuit court decisions cited therein. 
277 For example, Enderby v Frenchay Health Authority [1993] IRLR 591 (ECJ). 
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However, market value is not necessarily a neutral factor and can lead to the 
perpetuation of discrimination due to historical societal discriminatory employment 
practices.278  I am therefore inclined to agree with the judgment of Lord Denning in 
the case of Clay Cross (Quarry Services) Ltd v Fletcher279 in the United Kingdom 
that permitting reliance on market forces that are unrelated to job qualifications may 
render the pay discrimination prohibition a ‘dead letter’.  Where an employer is able 
to rely on extrinsic forces as a defence to pay disparities, ‘the door would be wide 
open. Every employer who wished to avoid the statute would walk straight through 
it.’280 
I therefore propose caution be applied when accepting skills shortages and 
market value or forces as a rationale for disparate treatment in, for example, male 
and female dominated jobs when used as justification for unequal pay between 
employees performing work of equal value and the approach of the Canadian Human 
Rights Commission placing a heavy burden of proof on employers relying on market 
forces as a defence be applied in the South African context. 
  
 
278 Corning Glass v Brennan 417 U.S. 188 (1974).  Shelley Kroll ‘Beyond Equal Pay for Equal Work: 
recent developments in the United States, Great Britain, and Canada’ (1984) 7 B.C. Int’l & Comp L Rev 
179 at 198. 
279 Clay Cross (Quarry Services) Ltd v Fletcher [1979] I.C.R. 1. 
280 Ibid.  
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7. CHALLENGES ARISING FROM THE ADMINISTRATION AND 
INSTITUTION OF CLAIMS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
As referred to earlier in this dissertation, challenges to discriminatory practices 
pertaining to the terms and conditions of employment of employees performing the 
same work, substantially the same work or work of equal value are complaint based.  
In this regard, section 10 of the EEA provides that an employee may refer a 
discrimination dispute in terms of section 6(4) to the CCMA within six months after 
the act or omission that allegedly constituted unfair discrimination.281  Following the 
referral of the dispute, the CCMA must attempt to resolve the dispute through 
conciliation.282  Where a dispute remains unresolved after conciliation, it may be 
referred to the Labour Court for adjudication.  The CCMA may however arbitrate 
the dispute where the employee alleging the discrimination earns below the earnings 
threshold determined by the Minster of Labour in terms of section 6(3) of the BCEA 
or where the parties consent to the arbitration of the dispute. 
With this in mind, the question that arises is whether the current dispute 
resolution model prescribed by the EEA facilitates the achievement of its stated 
objective of obtaining pay or remuneration equity in the workplace.283  For the 
reasons that follow, I submit that the response to this question is “no”. 
 
281 Section 10(2) of the EEA. 
282 Section 10(5) of the EEA. 
283 Code of Good Practice, para 1.2. 
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7.1. Challenges experienced by individual complainants 
As demonstrated in chapter 4 of this dissertation, an individual, complaint-based 
approach to challenging pay discrimination places a significant burden on employees 
who are often under resourced, unassisted and unfamiliar with the complexities 
associated with the articulation and evidential substantiation of pay discrimination 
claims.284  This is particularly given the challenges referred to in section 4.2 above to 
obtaining the requisite information to formulate a coherent claim prior to the 
institution of proceedings. 
Although a discovery process is available to litigants in the Labour Court (as 
well as in terms of Rule 29(1) of the Rules for the Conduct of Proceedings before the 
CCMA), a ‘person requiring discovery is in general only entitled to discovery once 
the battle lines are drawn and the legal issues established.  It is not a tool designed to 
put a party in a position to draw the battle lines and establish the legal issues.’285  
Thus, until such time as an applicant in a section 6(4) dispute is able to precisely 
delineate the scope of his or her complaint, the discovery process will not be at the 
applicant’s disposal.  This is particularly so given that the relevance of the 
information required through the discovery process is assessed with reference to the 
 
284 Fredman op cit (n179) at 206.  While it is not necessary for an applicant to anticipate and negate 
every defence that might be available to the employer party, applicants cannot pursue an equal pay 
claim without disclosing (i) the personal circumstances of each applicant; (ii) his or her post in the 
organisation; (iii) level of remuneration; (iv) the chosen comparator; (v) the basis of the comparison 
and without asserting the basis on which any differential is alleged to constitute unfair discrimination 
in the form of a breach of the principle of equal work for the same or similar work, or work of equal 
value – Brilliant and Others v Gauteng Gambling Board (JS276/15; JS721/14) [2015] ZALCJHB 379 
(12 October 2015) at para 9. 
285 Van Loggerenberg Erasmus Superior Court Practice (2nd ed) vol 2 at D1-458 – D1-459.   
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pleadings and it is the party seeking discovery who bears the onus of proving that he 
or she is entitled to discovery.286  
I therefore submit that the legislature ought to have been mindful of these 
obstacles and its potential to deter employees from pursuing claims under section 
6(4) of the EEA.  Means of addressing these challenges could have included: 
The creation of a commission or an investigative unit of the Department of 
Labour or CCMA similar to the United States Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) which is responsible for the 
enforcement of federal anti-discrimination laws such as Title VII and 
the Equal Pay Act.  The EEOC is endowed with the authority to 
investigate claims of discrimination, file lawsuits on behalf of the 
complainants or in the public interest and litigate these cases.  The 
possible advantages of the establishment of a commission or unit in 
South Africa with powers similar to those of the EEOC referred to 
above include (i) the identification of claims without reasonable cause 
before parties are embroiled in a process of costly and lengthy 
litigation; (ii) the likelihood of there being a greater motivation to 
settle disputes at conciliation where there is a coherent and well-
researched claim articulated against an employer; and (iii) creating a 
buffer between an employee and her employer where the commission 
or unit litigates on the complainants behalf.  This may assist in 
diluting the adversarial atmosphere created by a dispute by an 
 
286 Continental Ore Construction v Highveld Steel and Vacuum Corporation Ltd 1971 (4) SA 589 (W) 
at 598D-F.Swissborough Diamond Mines (Pty) Ltd v Government of the Republic of South Africa 1999 
(2) SA 279 (T) at 311A; Zono v Minister of Correctional Services & others (2009) 30 ILJ 2976  (LC) 
at para 31.  
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individual complainant and allowing greater scope for the 
preservation of the ongoing employment relationship. 
The creation of a two-stage process for the management and resolution of 
claims based on a difference in terms and conditions of employment 
where the complainant and the comparator are alleged to conduct 
work of equal value, as seen with the example of the procedure 
established for the hearing of equal value claims by the Employment 
Tribunal in the United Kingdom.287  In this regard, the first stage 
essentially requires a merit assessment to be conducted by the 
presiding officer to determine whether it will proceed with the 
determination of the dispute before it or whether it is necessary to 
first appoint an independent expert to evaluate the jobs and establish 
facts relevant to the claim in order to effectively adjudicate the claim 
and prescribe an appropriate remedy.288  Examples of the 
circumstances in which the tribunal may make an order appointing an 
independent expert to assist it include where a party is not legally 
represented or where it is of the view that insufficient information 
may have been disclosed by a party.289  The second stage of the 
process is the hearing of the claim.  I submit that the introduction of 
an initial stage similar to the above in the adjudication of claims 
 
287 http://www.equalpayportal.co.uk/the-law/ (Last accessed on 6 January 2019). 
288 Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) (Amendment) Regulations 2004 (as 
amended) available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2004/2351/regulation/2/made (Last accessed 
9 January 2019).  Independent Data Services Ltd IDS employment law handbook: “equal pay” (2011) 
Thomson Reuters at 186. 
289 Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) (Amendment) Regulations 2004 (as 
amended) at item 6(1) of Schedule 6. 
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alleging work of equal value under section 6(4) of the EEA would not 
only assist in rooting out claims without reasonable cause, but it 
would also provide much needed assistance in the form of an 
independent expert to thoroughly investigate and report on the 
complex issue of when work is considered to be of equal value. 
Empowering the Department of Labour or a statutory institution specialising 
in “equal pay” disputes to commission independent evaluations of 
employers’ job evaluation systems where there are allegations of 
subjectivity or bias, as with the example of the Canadian Human 
Rights Commission.290  This would facilitate a proactive approach to 
addressing discriminatory employment practices as opposed to being 
reactive to the institution of a claim. 
7.2. Overburdened dispute resolution fora 
The South African dispute resolution fora tasked with the resolution of disputes 
arising from section 6(4) of the EEA are under significant capacity constraints.  
Recent experience in litigating in the Labour Court, Johannesburg has been that 
matters are allocated trial dates, at the earliest, between 12 to 18 months after the 
filing of a pre-trial minute.  In respect of the CCMA, during the 2017/18 financial 
year, an average of 754 new cases were referred every working day.291   
 
290 Kroll op cit (n278) at 220. 
291 Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration annual report 2017/2018 financial year.  
Available at http://www.ccma.org.za/About-Us/Reports-Plans/Annual-Reports (accessed 6 January 
2019). 
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Given the evidential complexities that arise in “equal pay” disputes, the 
adjudication of these disputes are likely to be protracted.  Furthermore, evidence 
surrounding issues relevant to the adjudication of such disputes such as job 
evaluation systems, market forces and performance evaluation are highly specialised.  
It is therefore arguable that it would be a more effective use of state resources to 
have specialists initially processing and adjudicating claims under section 6(4) of the 
EEA, with a right of appeal to the Labour Court, rather than requiring the Labour 
Court to be a forum of first instance or to require CCMA commissioners to acquire 
expert knowledge of such issues.  
A specialist tribunal which deals exclusively with issues surrounding “pay 
discrimination” and pay equity ought to have been established to inter alia provide 
guidance on the interpretation and application of the requirements surrounding the 
concept of equal pay for equal work and the reduction of income differentials within 
the workplace, similar to the Canadian Human Rights Commission, as well as 
perform training and dispute resolution functions.  In order to ensure compliance 
with South Africa’s obligations to ensure the application of the principle of equal 
remuneration for work of equal value, this tribunal ought to have been endowed with 
oversight powers to monitor and verify compliance.  Furthermore, consideration 
could further have been given to establishing sectoral committees, comprising of 
employer and employee parties similar to a bargaining council, to formulate job 
evaluation methods and tools that can be used by companies in a given sector.292   
 
292 Chicha op cit (n267) at 59. 
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8. CONCLUSION 
Discrimination claims premised on pay disparities were entertained by the South 
African labour courts prior to the enactment of the current section 6(4) of the EEA.  
Having considered the requirements for establishing a claim under section 6(4) of 
the EEA, the scope of defences available to an employer to respond to a claim of 
discrimination and the challenges facing litigants in the administration and 
institution of claims, it is my submission that section 6(4) takes the advancement of 
the constitutional protection of equality no further.  The reasons therefor are 
summarised below. 
8.1. An employer’s prerogative is largely maintained 
Although a process of juridification has resulted in the codification of a prohibition 
against discriminatory practices in respect of the granting of terms and conditions of 
employment to employees performing the same work, substantially the same work or 
work of equal value, in the absence of a right to equal pay in such circumstances, 
there remains a significant preservation of an employer’s autonomy to determine the 
terms and conditions that are granted to employees.   
In the absence of a general obligation on non-designated employers to 
‘correct the institutional structures which give rise to the discrimination’ or make 
‘systematic progress towards pay equity’, until such time as a complaint results in an 
order directing an employer to take steps to prevent the same unfair discrimination or 
a similar practice occurring in the future in respect of other employees, there is no 
mandatory requirement to address disparities in terms and conditions of employment 
for employees conducting the same work, substantially the same work or work of 
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equal value.293   Neither is there a proverbial “carrot” to adopt an equal pay practice 
in the workplace, for example, as is the case with implementation of broad-based 
black economic empowerment initiatives to obtain a rating pursuant to the Broad-
Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003.  Thus, the ability to achieve 
equality remains primarily within the hands of the employer.   
8.2. The limitations of a complaints-led model 
A complaints-led model merely assists with providing a remedy to aggrieved 
complainants and does not provide a means to examine and rectify structures that 
perpetuate discrimination.  As explained in section 1.4 above, this only provides a 
partial framework for the achievement of equality. 
What is notably missing from the so-called “equal pay” provisions of the 
EEA, the related Employment Equity Regulations, 2014 and Code of Good Practice 
is a requirement that an employer engage with its workforce on the assessment of the 
value of work in its organisation, the consequential application of policies regulating 
terms and conditions of employment as well as the extent to which structural or 
societal prejudices impact the evaluation of work.  Doing so, I submit, would have 
increased the awareness and understanding of the requirements of various roles 
within an organisation which, in turn, would serve to limit the scope of an employer 
implementing discriminatory means of evaluation and reduce the referral of claims 
premised on ill-informed perceptions of the value of work.  Further, and perhaps 
most importantly, a consultative or consensus driven approach to the evaluation of 
work would have created a ‘co-operative culture for equal pay’ and greater 
 
293 See the powers of the Labour Court in section 50(2)(c) of the EEA.  Fredman, supra 284.   
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legitimacy for the exercise of an employer’s discretion in the allocation of terms and 
conditions of employment to its employees based on the value of their work.294 
8.3. The limitations of a statutorily-defined comparator 
Apart from these omissions in construction of section 6(4) of the EEA, other 
shortcomings in its formulation include the narrowly defined comparator which is a 
prerequisite for the establishment of a case of discrimination pursuant thereto.  The 
requirement to produce the correct comparator at the outset of litigation poses a 
significant hurdle to a complainant, particularly given the restrictions on obtaining 
sufficient data in support of a claim at the inception thereof, which often results in 
employees being unsuited prior to a proper investigation into the complaint.    
8.4. The complexities associated with evaluating the value of work 
Neither section 6(4) of the EEA, the Employment Equity Regulations, 2014 nor the 
Code of Good Practice provide comprehensive guidance on the extent to which 
critical areas of dispute in the evaluation of jobs ought to be approached.  Nor do 
they require a consultative or consensus-driven process between an employer and its 
workforce to assess the value of work in the organisation.  Consequently, significant 
autonomy is afforded to an employer to decide how to quantify the value of work.  
This not only results in a possible lack of uniformity in the implementation of job 
evaluations within a workplace, but also facilitates the continued application of 
outdated evaluations as a means of legitimising discrepancies in terms and 
conditions of employment. 
 
294 Fredman discussed in Victoria Hooten ‘This is a (Wo)Man’s world: reforming UK Equal Pay’ 
(2015) 3 Legal Issues J 65 at 83. 
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8.5. The deference to employer prerogative in a consideration of defences 
For the reasons discussed more fully in chapter 6 above, the legislature maintained a 
significant degree of deference to employer prerogative when formulating the suite 
of defences available to an employer when faced with a dispute pursuant to section 
6(4) of the EEA.  In this regard, reliance may legitimately be placed on more 
subjective factors such as performance, competence, potential and market value of 
an employee’s skills.  Permitting reliance on these factors arguably means that 
disparate treatment may always be attributed to seemingly non-discriminatory 
reasons. 
8.6. The failure to create a specialist statutory tribunal or commission to assist 
with inter alia the investigation of claims and dispute resolution  
In light of the complaints-led model of South Africa’s so-called equal pay law, the 
role of the already overburdened Labour Court and CCMA in the application of 
section 6(4) of the EEA is limited to dispute resolution functions.  This is 
insufficient to assist with the effective enforcement of “equal pay” compliance. 
Firstly, given the complexities associated with the proper articulation and 
ventilation of an “equal pay” dispute, the Labour Court and CCMA provide 
insufficient support to employees and employers to understand and resolve “equal 
pay” disputes.  Consideration ought to have been given to the creation of a specialist 
commission or tribunal which assumes responsibility for the investigation of claims 
of discrimination, filing lawsuits on behalf of the complainants, litigating these 
cases, educating, providing guidance on and monitoring the implementation of 
“equal pay” and requisite evaluations in the workplace, as well as the appointment of 
experts to establish facts relevant to the resolution of a claim. 
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Secondly, the Labour Court or the CCMA only facilitates a reactive approach 
to eliminate pay discrimination in the workplace.  In order to ensure the proper 
protection of the right to equality, a statutory institution specialising in “equal pay” 
disputes ought to have been endowed with the power to commission independent 
evaluations of employers’ job evaluation systems where there are allegations of 
subjectivity or bias.  As set out above, this would permit with the proactive approach 
to addressing discriminatory employment practices. 
In the premises, for these reasons canvassed in my analysis of section 6(4) of the 
EEA, I submit that it only partially assists in giving effect to the constitutional 
protection of equality.  Equality in the form of equal pay for equal work is therefore 
likely to remain a Tantalus.  
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